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THE SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
REVIEW SECTION
PROBATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS
COLEMAN KARESH *
Probate Court jurisdiction in South Carolina is an ill-
defined thing, even in those fields in which that Court has
immemorially operated-either as the old Court of Ordinary
or as its modern successor. The jurisdiction of the Probate
Court over testamentary trusts is even more shadowy. That
court does not have inherent jurisdiction over trusts-testa-
mentary or other-and whatever jurisdiction it may have is
solely the result of statutory action. The statutes, however,
create the problem of jurisdiction, rather than fix or settle
it. It is this jurisdiction, and the problems thrown up by legis-
lation concerning it, that are the subject of this article.
When we check our first source of authority-after the
statutes themselves-namely, the reported cases, we find,
frankly, no satisfactory solution: the cases seem, instead of
resolving the difficulty, to compound it.
A second source of enlightenment is the opinions of those
lawyers who, in fact or by reputation, qualify as experts in
Probate Court practice. It must be said, after a digesting of
their views, that their opinions, for the most part, mirror the
uncertainties of the law, that none of their judgments ap-
proach the positive, and that they are, in truth, undisguised
confessions of doubt and open admissions of incomprehension.
A third avenue of search might prove enlightening: in-
quiries directed to the Probate Judges themselves, to learn
what their experience has been with, and what they think
about, trusts created by will. The inquiries thus made are the
principal subject of this piece, and the endeavor has been
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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built around a questionnaire directed to the Probate Judges
of the forty-six counties of this state. Obtaining replies has
been a long and arduous task, not altogether successful, but
the results may, at least, point up the problem, emphasize the
difficulties it presents, and, perhaps, bring home to some per-
sons the need for clarification or reform of the law. Replies
to the questionnaire were received from Probate Judges of
twenty-two counties: Aiken, Barnwell, Beaufort, Chester,
Clarendon, Darlington, Dillon, Edgefield, Fairfield, George-
town, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, Marion, Marlboro,
McCormick, Richland, Spartanburg, Union, Williamsburg,
York. To these obliging public servants is due a considerable
measure of congratulation and thanks-for essaying a diffi-
cult and time consuming task.1
The silence of the twenty-four Probate Judges who did not
respond may be attributed to one or more of the following fac-
tors: (a) inertia; (b) unobligingness; (c) the chores of office
-and, in some cases, running for it-and the consequent limi-
tations of time; (d) the honored American tradition of
prompt consignment of bills, advertising matter, requests for
contributions, notices of lodge meetings, and questionnaires,
to the wastebasket; (e) the judicial prerogative-or duty-
of refusing to pass on questions in the abstract; (f) the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (g) un-
certainty. The writer, without any charitable leaning, is in-
clined to the belief that the last factor-uncertainty-is the
factor chiefly responsible for the reticence of these twenty-
four,-an uncertainty not innate in the person, but induced
by the uncertainty of and in the law itself. If this is the chief
element, it is an item of considerable importance and highly
significant in itself. Perhaps one given to more scientific ap-
1. The study encompassed by this article was undertaken initially-
more than a year ago--, at the instance of the writer, by Mr. Gasper
L. Toole, III, then a senior law student. Before Mr. Toole received even
so much as a handful of replies to the questionnaire which he had
mailed out, he graduated from the law school and was admitted to the
bar. After his departure the filled-in questionnaires arrived in such a
slow trickle that the endeavor took on the character of a long-term
project. Student tenure being what it is, compared to the relative
longevity of the teacher, the writer undertook to carry on where his
eager student, called to more practical-and perhaps more useful-
enterprises, left off. The writer acknowledges his debt to Mr. Toole for
the start that he gave to this work.
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praisal might say that the unanswered questionnaires should
be broken down into the same proportions and given the
same relative evaluation as the answered questionnaires; but
since it can pretty well be taken for granted that people who
have positive, easily-stated views are not chary with them,
a more reasonable assumption is that answers have been
withheld because they cannot definitively be given. This, to
repeat, is not due to individual deficiencies, but to the fact
that the state of the law does not lend itself to easy solution.
These statements may smack of being professorially superior
or patronizing, but the writer denies that they are intended
to be so, since, if he had ever succeeded in getting a clear
picture in the first place, he would not have undertaken this
experiment in frustration.
It will be noted that conspicuously absent from the list
of those answering are several of the more populous and
wealthy counties, in which-it is a fact-many large trust
estates are being administered and in which corporate trustees
do an extensive business. Their absence diminishes somewhat
the representative character of the list, but it is not believed
that, on the whole, the conclusions to be drawn will be ma-
terially affected thereby.
Before setting out the questions submitted, and the an-
swers and comments, some preliminary, and rather extended,
observations on the Probate Court are in order.
The old Court of Ordinary gave way to the Probate Court
under the provisions of the Constitution of 1868. By Article
IV, Section I, it was provided:
"The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in two Circuit Courts, to wit: a Court of
Common Pleas, having civil jurisdiction, and a Court of
General Sessions, with criminal jurisdiction only, in Pro-
bate Courts, and in Justices of the Peace. The General
Assembly may establish such municipal and other in-
ferior Courts as may be deemed necessary."
By Article IV, Section 20, it was provided:
"A Court of Probate shall be established in each Coun-
ty, with jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of
administration, in business appertaining to minors and
the allotment of dower, in cases of idiocy and lunacy,
and persons non compotes mentis. * *"
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The effect of the two quoted sections was to make the
Probate Court a Constitutional court and constitutionally to
define and limit its powers. Thus, it was held in Davenport
v. Cc ldwetl, 2 that an Act 3 conferring jurisdiction on the Pro-
bate Court to effect partitions was unconstitutional, as being
in excess of the powers prescribed in the Constitution, be-
cause: "The jurisdiction thus defined and specified in the
Constitution can be neither enlarged nor diminished by the
legislative power of the State, which is itself the creature of
the Constitution, and controlled by the provisions of that
instrument, which constitutes the fundamental law." This
decision wa s approved and followed in Herndon v. Moore,
4
but there the court decided that, in order to protect titles
derived through Probate Court decrees in partition-sought
and issued on the common assumption that the power existed
in that court-it would give force to the maxim communis
error facit jus-a common error makes the law-and leave
undisturbed those partitions effected prior to the decision
in the Davenport case.
A similar striking down of legislative action, because
opposed to the constitutional definition and limitation of Pro-
bate Court powers, occurred in 'homas v. Poole,r in which,
while following the Herndon decision as to partitions ef-
fected before the statement of the law in the Davenport case,
the Supreme Court declared-affirming in part a lower court
decree-that the Probate Court was without power to ap-
point a trustee to succeed one who had died. The lower court
decree, thus in part affirmed, stated: "The Court of Probate
has no power to appoint a trustee, the act of the legislature
giving this power being void for the same reason that it
could not confer jurisdiction in partition."
The status of the Probate Court was materially changed
by the Constitution of 1895. By Article V, Section I, it is
provided, in part:
"The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in two Circuit Courts, to wit: A Court
of Common Pleas having civil jurisdiction and a Court
of General Sessions with criminal jurisdiction only. The
2. 10 S. C. 317 (1877).
3. 14 Stat. 77; Rev. Stat. 1873, 573, Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 40.
4. 18 S. C. 339 (1882).
5. 19 S. C. 323 (1882).
4
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General Assembly may also establish County Courts,
municipal Courts and such Courts in any or all of the
Counties of this State as may be necessary. * *"
It will thus be seen that the Probate Court is omitted
from this delineation of constitutional courts and ceases to
have the stature that it had under the Constitution of 1868.
By Article V, Section 19, it is further provided:
"The Court of Probate shall remain as now established
in the County of Charleston. In all other Counties of
the State the jurisdiction in all matters testamentary
and of administration, in business appertaining to
minors, and the allotment of dower, and persons no
compos mentis, shall be vested as the General Assembly
may provide, and until such provision such jurisdiction
shall remain in the Court of Probate as now established." 6
6. The reason for the singling out of the Charleston Probate Court
is difficult to ascertain. As will be seen from Bradford v. Richardson,
111 S. C. 205, 97 S. E. 58 (1918), hereafter discussed in the text in detail,
the effect of this isolation was to make the Charleston Probate Court a
Constitutional court, putting it into the mere select company of courts
mentioned in Section I of the same Article. Neither the Journal of the
Convention nor the newspaper accounts of the proceedings throw any
light on the Convention's action in this particular, nor has the writer
been able to discover from other sources what prompted the Convention
to give this special treatment to a single county of the state. It may be
surmised that the Convention's act was a tangible recognition of a pre-
eminence based on reasons more substantial than antiquity, and that it
was a merited tribute to a prestige not enjoyed by the courts of the
other counties. As to the continued deservedness of that signal and su-
perlative distinction, the writer is not in a position to judge.
But a second look into this selective provision may reveal something
else. Whatever the motives for this special attention on the part of
the Convention-and in whatever ways the Charleston Probate Court
in 1895 may have operated differently from the courts in other counties,
if at all-the effect of the provision may not, after all, be so gratifying
to the denizens and friends of Charleston. If the Charleston court is
a Constitutional court and must remain-under the mandate of the
Constitution of 1895-precisely as it was in 1895, then, presumably,
it was to continue in a rigid form-that is, under the then existing
law. That law was embodied in the decisions based on the Constitution
of 1868. See the cases cited in notes 2, 4 and 5 supra. The result of
treating the Charleston court as a Constitutional court, and the ab-
sence of the words used with reference to the courts of the other
counties--"shall be vested as the General Assembly may provide"-
may show an intent to "freeze" the powers of the Charleston court
5
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The impact of these sections is stated in Bradford v.
Richardso?,7 a case dealing with the validity of the so-called
Quart-a-Month law,8 which authorized the various Probate
Judges to issue permits for the importation from other states
of intoxicating liquors, limited to a quart a month. The Act
was attacked, among other reasons, on the ground that the
Probate Court was a constitutional court, with powers not
capable of enlargement by the legislature, and that the power
conferred upon the Probate Judges by the Act was in excess
of the defined constitutional limits. The Supreme Court de-
nied the force of this contention, saying (after reference to
the provisions of Article V, Section 19, and after noting the
special mention of Charleston County):
"But that section expressly provides that in all other
counties the jurisdiction that formerly belonged to the
Probate Court 'shall be vested as the General Assembly
may provide.' It follows that the Probate Court is not
and put them beyond the reach of the legislature. The Charleston Pro-
bate Court is thus enclosed within a circle of constitutional power
which can neither contract nor expand. The legislature, it is true,
cannot abolish the Charleston court-as it is suggested in Bradford v.
Richardson that it may do with the Probate Courts of the other
counties. Nor can the legislature subtract from the powers that the
Charleston court possessed in 1895. But, by the same token, it cannot
add to them. As a practical matter, since the legislature will hardly
undertake to abolish Probate Courts anywhere, or drastically to curtail
their powers, the net effect is to make the Charleston court one of even
more limited jurisdiction than the courts of the other counties. To be
specific-in terms of the matters embraced in this article-and if the
Charleston Court had no jurisdiction over testamentary trusts in 1895,
the cases of Poole v. Brown, note 10 supra, and Thomas v. Poole, note 5
supra, and the dominant one of Davenport v. Caldwell, note 2 supra, seem
to indicate that no Probate Court had such jurisdiction-it would fol-
low that the Charleston Probate Court has had no such jurisdiction
since 1895; that it can do no more, with or without legislative
sanction, in the years since 1895 than it could do in the years prior.
There is more than mere plausibility in the argument that the Charles-
ton court, despite statutes referring to testamentary trustees, has no
authority at all over them.
7. Note 6 supra.
8. 30 Stat. 69 (1917). This Act went into a coma with the adoption
of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
It was revived with that amendment's repeal, and it later expired
with-or it may have found a more glorious after-life in-the present
state liquor laws.
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a constitutional court in any county except Charleston
and that in any or all the other counties the legislature
may vest the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Pro-
bate Court, in other Courts, as it may deem expedient.
This power necessarily includes the power to abolish the
Court entirely, and consequently the power to invest it
with such jurisdiction as the legislature may see fit,
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution."
After thus sustaining this grant of judicial power, the
court supplements its conclusion by treating the act to be
done as a ministerial, rather than a judicial, act-the conduct
of the Probate Judge in the issuance of the permit being
done by him personally and not as a court, and putting the
furnishing of permits in the same category as the issuance
of a marriage license, 9 one of the more common tasks of
Probate Judges in South Carolina.
It seems to the writer that the latter justification for the
course the court took is sounder than the first. In the quoted
language of the court, there is an important elision: the
constitutional section in question provides, not that jurisdic-
tion shall be vested as the General Assembly may provide,
but that in matters testamentary, etc., it shall be so vested.
It may very plausibly be argued that it was the intention
of the Constitutional Convention to permit Probate Courts to
have only such powers as the legislature might confer, wheth-
er more or less extensive than they previously had, but in
any event limited to matters testamentary, etc., as detailed
9. The Probate Judge performs a variety of functions in addition
to those usually associated with his office: in some counties he acts
as Master in Equity; he issues marriage licenses-Sec. 8588, S. C. Code
of Laws 1942; he disburses Confederate pensions-See. 4981, id.; in
some counties he presides over Children's Courts, which is made a part
of his court-Sec. 255, id.I In one county-Clarendon-the office of the
Judge of Probate was abolished and the functions pertaining to the
Probate Court devolved upon the Clerk of Court. Acts 1931 (37 Stat.)
13. See Ridgill v. Clarendon County, 188 S. C. 460, 199 S. E. 783 (1938).
Under Bradford v. Richardson, note 6 supra, these various acts,
authorized by the legislature, whether judicial or ministerial in their
nature, can properly be performed. A dreadful thought occurs: what
about the issuance of marriage licenses in Charleston, if the Probate
Court of that county did not issue them before 1895? But there is no
cause for alarm: (1) the issuance of a marriage license is a ministerial,
not a judicial, act; (2) common law marriage exists in South Carolina;
(3) communis error fadt jus.
7
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in Section 19. If this is a tenable construction, it would follow
that legislation conferring jurisdiction on Probate Courts over
trusts-which are not, as will be seen hereafter,10 matters
testamentary or of administration-would be invalid, as it
was held to be prior to 1895. But-ita lex seripta est-thus is
the law written-, and the case of Beatty v. National Surety
Co.," although dealing with a subject unlelated to that in the
Bradford case, seems to echo the views of that case. If it be
concluded that the legislature can confer any power on the
Probate Court, whether or not germane to those matters
specifically set out in Article V, Section 19, it follows that
it can invest that court with as ample authority over trusts
as it sees fit; and the question would then be-has the legis-
lature invested the Probate Court with jurisdiction over testa-
mentary trusts, and, if so, to what extent?
Probate Courts are, under the Constitution and statutes,
and by their very nature, inferior courts, but this should be
taken to mean that they are inferior only in their relative
,standing in the hierachy of courts, and that they are not
inferior in respect to matters clearly within their special
jurisdiction, nor with respect to the dignity of their records. 2
And, of course, Probate Courts are courts of record.13 Their
decrees, generally, are not subject to collateral attack.14 In
10. See Thomas v. Poole, note 5 supra. And see Poole v. Brown, 12
S. C. 556 (1879), and the discussion of this case under the comment in
Question I of the questionnaire.
11. 132 S. C. 45, 128 S. E. 40 (1925).
12. Thomas v. Poole, note 5 supra; Turner v. Malone, 24 S. C. 398
(1885); State ex tel. Burnett v. Burnside, 33 S. C. 276, 11 S. E. 787
(1890); Ex Parte White, 38 S. C. 41, 16 S. E. 286 (1892); Hendrix
v. Holden, 58 S. C. 495, 36 S. E. 1010 (1900); Norwood v. Ry Co., 203
S. C. 456, 27 S. E. (2d) 803 (1943).
13. Sec. 206, S. C. Code of Laws, 1942; Thomas v. Poole, note 5 supra;
Turner v. Malone, note 12 supra; State ex 'el. Burnett v. Burnside,
note 12 supra; Hendrix v. Holden, note 12 supra; In "re Willcox, 162
S. C. 133, 160 S. E. 260 (1931); Truesdale v. Bellinger, 172 S. C. 80,
172 S. E. 384 (1933); Williams v. Ins. Co., 187 S. C. 103, 190 S. E.
519 (1938); Norwood v. Ry Co., note 12 supra.
14. The cases on this point are too numerous for full citation; but
see, Ward v. Glenn, 9 Richardson's Law 127 (1855); En Parte White,
note 12 supra; Hankinson v. R. R. Co., 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206 (1893);
Hartley v. Glover, 56 S. C. 69, 33 S. E. 796 (1899); MeNair v. Howle,
123 S. C. 252, 116 S. E. 279 (1922) ; Hendrix v. Holden, note 12 supra;
Mitchell v. Dreher, 150 S. C. 125, 147 S. E. 646 (1929) ; Wilkinson v. Wil-
kinson, 178 S. C. 194, 182 S. E. 640 (1935) ; Thompson v. Anderson, 208
8
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any event, however, it must be remembered that they are
courts of limited jurisdiction, 5 and, since the Constitution of
1895, and under the law as stated inBradford v. Richardson,16
they have only such powers as are conferred by statute.
Of controlling importance, moreover, is the fact that the
jurisdiction of the Probate Courts is not exclusive, and that
the Courts of Common Pleas, especially in their equity branch,
have concurrent jurisdiction. 17 Qualifying this rule is the
S. C. 208, 37 S. E. (2d) 581 (1946) ; Weinberg v. Weinberg, 208 S. C. 157"
37 S. E. (2d) 507 (1946); Sisk v. Pressley, 81 Fed. Supp. 16 (E.D.S.C.
-1948); Davis v. Davis, 214 S. C. 247, 52 S. E. (2d) 192 (1949).
See, also, Sec. 221, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
15. Walker v. Russell, 10 S. C. 82 (1877); Davenport v. Caldwell,
note 2 supra; Herndon v. Moore, note 4 supra; Turner v. Malone, note
12 supra; Whitesides v. Barnes, 24 S. C. 373 (1885); Ex Parte White,
note 12 supra; State ex rel. Burnett v. Burnside, note 12 supra;
Dyson v. Jones, 65 S. C. 308, 43 S. E. 667 (1902); Bradford v. Rich-
ardson, note 6 supra; Beatty v. National Surety Co., note 11 supra;
Beckwith v. McAllister, 165 S. C. 1, 162 S. E. 623 (1923); Beacham v.
Ross, 187 S. C. 398, 197 S. E. 369 (1938); Mack v. Stanley, 190 S. C.
300, 2 S. E. (2d) 792 (1939); Norwood v. Ry. Co., note 12 supra;
Davis v. Davis, note 14 supra.
16. Note 6 supra.
17. Walker v. Russell, note 15 supra; Jordan v. Moses, 10, S. C. 431
(1878); Witte v. Clark, 17 S. C. 313 (1881); McKibben v. Salinas,
41 S. C. 105, 15 S. E. 208 (1893); Fogle v. St. Michael Church,
48 S. C. 86, 26 S. E. 99 (1896); Epperson v. Jackson, 83 S. C. 157,
65 S. E. 217 (1909)'; Hand v. Kelly, 102 S. C. 151, 86 S. E. 382
(1915); Lucas Bank, In re Fleming, 125 S. C. 446, 119 S. E. 118
(1923); Chapman v. Smith, 133 S. C. 122, 130 S. E. 212 (1925);
Beatty v. National Surety Co., note 11 supra; Dorn v. Stidham, 139
S. C. 66, 137 S. E. 331 (1926); Muldrow v. Jeffords, 144 S. C. 509, 142
S. E. 602 (1927); Bailey v. Cooley, 153 S. C. 78, 150 S. E. 473
(1929); American Surety Co. v. Muckenfuss, 172 S. C. 169, 173 S. E.
290 (1933); Carolina Life Insurance Co. v. Arrowsmith, 174 S. C.
161, 176 S. E. 128 (1934); Morris v. Maryland Cas. Co., 187 S. C.
150, 197 S. E. 505 (1938); Davis v. Davis, note 14 supra.
The statement that the Court of Common Pleas has concurrent juris.
diction is true only as a generalization. Prior to 1895, the Probate
Court was held to have exclusive jurisdiction in some cases, and the Com-
mon Pleas jurisdiction was there only appellate. See Ex Parte White,
note 12 supra. Moreover, it is a common principle that where a right
is created by statute and the tribunal to enforce it is designated, that
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Lewie, 17 S. C. 153
(1881). In that case the court was considering an application for
assignment of homestead which had been directed to the Court of
Common Pleas in the face of a then current statute (since modified)
that application for homestead should be addressed to the Probate
9
Karesh: Probate Court Jurisdiction Over Testamentary Trusts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1949
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
principle that where courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the
doctrine of comity will permit that one which has first as-
sumed jurisdiction of the subject matter to pursue it to
the end, without interference or parallel action by the other.18
The principle is thus stated in Witte v. Clarke:19 "Where
two tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction, the one which first
obtains possession of the subject matter must adjudicate,
and neither can be forced into another jurisdiction." The
comity rule here has a dual operation: if the Probate Court
has "first obtained possession of the subject matter", the
Court of Common Pleas must decline to entertain jurisdic-
tion, except on appeal; if the Court of Common Pleas has
Judge. The court held that resort to the Probate Judge was exclusive,
saying "The Court of Common Pleas is the general fountain of justice,
and when the rights of a citizen, either derived from the common
law or the statutes, are invaded, and the power to protect is conferred
upon no special jurisdiction, he may seek redress in that court. But
where rights are created by statutes, to be obtained and corrected in a
special manner specified in the act and by a special tribunal, no other
court can assume jurisdiction. On the contrary, parties interested must
pursue the course prescribed, and must seek the aid of the tribunal
upon which the power to grant or protect has been conferred." More
recently, in American Surety Company v. Muckenfuss, supra, the court
held that a surety who sought to be relieved as a matter of course
under the provisions of a statute authorizing the release of sureties on
bonds required by the Probate Court (See. 8977, S. C. Code of Laws,
1932, 1942) could not properly direct its application to the Court of
Common Pleas, but that it was limited to the Probate Court, upon
which the right to grant relief was conferred by the statute which had
created the right.
The principle of Common Pleas concurrence with the Probate Court
runs the scale of the latter's jurisdiction, including the probate of
wills (at least in solemn form), accountings, sale of land in aid of
assets, allotment of dower, matters touching upon minors and lunatics
and the administration of their estates. It is doubtful, however, if
the Court of Common Pleas could, or would, admit a will to probate in
common form, grant letters testamentary or of administration, revoke
letters, receive returns in the absence of litigation, or do many of the
routine acts of administration devolving upon the Probate Judge. In
this connection see the dissenting opinion of Justice Blease in Muldrow
v. Jeffords, supra.
18. Jordan v. Moses, note 17 supra; Witte v. Clark, note 17 supra;
Dyson v. Jones, note 15 supra; Beatty v. National Surety Co., note
11 supra; Bailey v. Cooley, note 17 supra; American Surety Co. v.
Muckenfuss, note 17 supra; Davis v. Davis, note 14 supra.
19. Note 17 supra.
10
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first assumed it, there can be no resort to the Probate Court.20
The pertinent, and practical, significance of these interlock-
ing principles, as applied to testamentary trusts, is that, if
the legislature has vested either limited or total trust juris-
diction in the Probate Courts, such jurisdiction is not ex-
clusive but may concurrently be exercised by the Court of
Common Pleas as a court of equity; and, further, that if,
and to the extent that, the latter has assumed control of the
subject matter, the Probate Court is deprived of it. As a
matter of fact, the prevailing practice is to have recourse to
the Court of Common Pleas rather than to the Probate Court;
and even those lawyers who admit to the existence of trust
jurisdiction in the Probate Court, or who may doubt its
powers without actually denying them, justify that course
of higher-up procedure by pointing out that; in any event,
the Court of Common Pleas has concurrent jurisdiction. The
justification is, of course, stronger with those who doubt;
and, naturally, with those who deny such powers the only
consistent course is to seek out the Court of Common Pleas.
A number of the Probate Judges themselves, aware of the
shakiness of their position, suggest utilization of the Court
of Common Pleas and the avoidance of their own tribunals.
Even in those matters in which the Probate Court un-
doubtedly has competence, the jurisdiction is not all-em-
bracing. The Probate Court certainly has jurisdiction, for
example, over executors, but not every act done, or sought
to be done, by an executor is properly within its surveillance;
nor is every remedy against an executor to be sought in that
court. It has been held that, with respect to fiduciaries an-
swerable to the Probate Court, it cannot act where the remedy
sought constitutes a "distinct ground of equitable relief."
Thus, in Caldwell v. Little,2 an attempt in the Probate Court
to show collusion between representatives of the estate ad-
ministered and those of another estate indebted to it was
held to be a matter of equitable cognizance and not within
the scope of "matters testamentary or of administration",
although personal representatives were involved. In Beckwith
v. McAllister,2 2 an authorization by the Probate Court to an
20. For instances of both situations, see the cases mentioned in note
18 supra.
21. 15 S. C. 236 (1880).
22. Note 15 supra.
11
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executrix to cancel a mortgage which she had given to her
testate and to give in its place another mortgage, which was
to be junior to another which she individually was to give
to a third person, was held not to be within the power of that
court. (It is to be doubted whether even a circuit court could
effectuate such a design.) In Mack v. Stanley,23 the Probate
Court was held to be without power to authorize an executor
to give a mortgage, although, undoubtedly, it is within the
power of a court of equity to authorize such an act.24 And,
where an account has been stated and settled in the Probate
Court between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries, that court
has been held not to have the power to reopen it; but resort
must be had in equity to falsify or surcharge the account.2
Instances may be multiplied to show the lack of co-extensive-
ness of Probate Court power with that of a court of equity
in those fields in which the former may operate, but they all
merely substantiate the basic statement that equitable powers
as such are not available to Probate Courts.
We now proceed to the topics embraced in the question-
naire, with the answers to the questions submitted, and, for
what they are worth, the writer's comments. (In putting
the questions beginning "Have you construed * * or do you
now interpret" the Probate Judges were asked to indicate
whether the answers were based on actual cases before them,
or merely on opinion. In most instances, there was a failure
on their part to specify. In any event, the answers can, in
every case, be taken as the expression of opinion.)
I
Section 208 of the South Carolina Code of Laws of 1942
provides as follows:
"Every judge of probate, in his county, shall have
jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of adminis-
23. 190 S. C. 300, 2 S. E. (2d) 792 (1939).
24. Spencer v. Godfrey, Bailey's Equity 478 (1831); Spencer v.
Gibbes, Dudley's Equity 174 (1838); McDavid v. McDavid, 187 S. C.
127, 191 S. E. 204 (1938).
25. Harris v. Stilwell, 4 S. C. 19 (1872). See Anderson v. Bowers,
170 Fed. (2d) 676 (C.C.A. 4-E. D. S. C.-1948.
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tration, in business appertaining to minors, and the al-
lotment of dower, in cases of idiocy and lunacy, and of
persons non compos mentis."
Is it your opinion that this section gives you general juris-
diction over testamentary trustees to the same extent that
jurisdiction is conferred over executors and administrators?
17 Probate Judges answered yes; 5 answered no.
Of those answering in the affirmative, 2 stated that their
jurisdiction under this section extended to everything except
the removal and naming of trustees; 1 remarked that "pos-
sibly" he had such co-extensive jurisdiction; 1 stated that he
had such jurisdiction in a "limited" sense; 1 stated that the
Probate Court was the only court that had jurisdiction over
trust estates.
Comment: It is to be noted that the quoted section is
repetitive in part of Article V, Section 19, of the Constitution
of 1895, and of Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution
of 1868. This may seem superficially to be merely an affirma-
tion or restatement of the power conferred by the consti-
tutions to legislate in these fields, but the provision, it is
reasonably clear, is itself an extensive and plenary grant
of power to the Probate Courts, carrying with it the ancillary
power to do those things necessary and incident to the cus-
tomary functions of that court in matters testamentary and
of administration, as developed and crystallized in the Courts
of Ordinary. Those incidents are, however, controlled by en-
actments scattered throughout the statutes, and the historic
powers of the Ordinary are shaped and modified by these
various provisions.
To justify an affirmative answer to the question asked,
there would, in effect, have to be the addition of the word
"trustees" wherever the words "executors" or "administra-
tors" appear in the various statutes, and the interpolation
of "trustees" in decisions treating of executors and admin-
istrators. Such a premise would be extreme indeed.
But the major question is whether the language used in
the section can be construed as embracing testamentary trusts.
The answer was given in 1879, in Poole v. Brown.8 In that
ease, the plaintiffs, beneficiaries under a testamentary trust,
26. Note 10 supra.
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brought suit in the Probate Court against the defendants, who
were executors and trustees under a will, for an accounting,
which involved, substantially, the conduct of the defendants
as trustees. The Probate Court refused the application of
the plaintiffs, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but
on the ground that there had been full payment. The circuit
court decree was an affirmation. The Supreme Court reversed
on the jurisdictional ground, although that point was not
raised in the court below. The Court said: "The question then
arises, whether the Probate Court had jurisdiction of a pe-
tition in the nature of a bill in equity by a cestui que trust,
alleging a breach of trust." The court, after referring to
Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution of 1868, declared
further:
"Unless the matter of the present suit can be regarded
as a 'matter testamentary', it cannot be brought within
the terms of the grant of jurisdiction. A trust, even
though testamentary, is not necessarily a 'matter testa-
mentary' in the sense of the Constitution. An action to
enforce the trust is based upon the liability of a trustee
and not that of an executor, and matters testamentary
are such as grow out of the liability of an executor."
Thus, by this case, matters of trusteeship are divorced
from the term "matters testamentary"; and no other words
in the section can be said to be related to trusts.
In Thomas v. Poole,2I as has already been pointed out,
the Probate Court, in an action for partition, appointed a
trustee in the place of one who had died. The circuit court
decree, which upset the appointment, placed its position on
the ground of "the act of the Legislature giving this power
being void for the same reason that it could not confer juris-
diction in partition." The particular act thus vitiated is not
set out anywhere in the case. It may. have been the provision
of what is now Section 209 of the Code of 1942, set out in
Question II, hereafter. The Supreme Court affirmed this por-
tion of the decree, but gave it as its opinion that the bene-
ficiary, having sought the appointment of the trustee, might
be estopped. No citation of case or statute is given by the ap-
pelate court. In any event, it must be observed that no at-
27. Note 5 supra.
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tempt was made to justify the Probate Court's appointment
as referable to any "matter testamentary".
These early judicial r6pudiations of an attempt to fit tes-
tamentary trusts into the broad framework of "matters tes-
tamentary" are clearly supportable. If the term "matters
testamentary" could embrace testamentary trusts simply be-
cause such trusts are created by will, then the term might
as sensibly touch upon every title derived through a will and
every relationship produced by a will; and thus the term could
be spun out into absurdity.
II
Section 209 of the Code provides as follows:
"The judge of probate shall have jurisdiction in re-
lation to the appointment and removal of guardians of
minors, insane and idiotic persons, and persons non
compos mentis, and in relation to the duties imposed by
law on such guardians, and the management and dispo-
sition of the estates of their wards. He shall exercise
original jurisdiction in relation to trustees appointed by
will."
(1) Have you construed this Section in actual cases be-
fore you, or do you now interpret it, as giving the Probate
Court the same general powers with respect to testamentary
trustees as over executors and administrators?
18 answered yes; 4 answered no. Of those answering yes,
4 stated that they had relied on the section in actual cases
before them. 1 stated that he had such power over trusts, un-
der this section, except as to substituting trustees; 'another
said he had jurisdiction under this section except as to nam-
ing or removing trustees.
Comment: The words "He shall exercise original juris-
diction in relation to trustees appointed by will" are, of
course, the words of concern. They appear first in "An Act
to Define the Jurisdiction and Regulate the Practice of Pro-
bate Courts", adopted in 1868, and stated in the preamble to
be pursuant to the provisions of Article IV, Section 20, of
the Constitution of 1868.28 In the original Act from which
Section 209 is drawn the words are: "He shall exercise origi-
28. 14 Stat. 76 (Sec. 5). The Act was incorporated into the 1870
Code of Procedure, 14 Stat. 431.
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nal jurisdiction in relation to trustees appointed by will in
cases prescribed by law." The identical language as to guard-
ians appears in both the original Act and the present section.
It will be observed, in the first place, that the words "in all
cases prescribed by law" do not appear in Section 209. These
words remain, following the original enactment, in the Re-
vised Statutes of 1873.- They were eliminated in the General
Statutes of 1882,- and have never reappeared since. What
the significance of these omitted words was, and what moti-
vated their removal-whether they were regarded as super-
fluous or as unduly restrictive-does not anywhere appear.
In the second place, this all-important sentence, both in its
original and in its present form, follows, as will be seen, a
provision devoted entirely to guardians; and the captions or
titles to the section in the original Act, and in the various
compiled statutes and codes since, say merely "In relation
to guardians". One may be allowed to speculate whether it
was not intended to limit the term "trustees appointed by
will" to trustees of minors or to testamentary guardians, in
view of the juxtaposition of these words with the general
provision as to guardians.
It is singular, indeed, that a provision with such formi-
dable potentialities should be so obscurely placed. Its mean-
ing, too, is, to say the least, somewhat unclear, but it would
be straining credulity to suggest that the statute confers
plenary powers upon the Probate Court; and to make the
words "original jurisdiction" read "general jurisdiction"
would be a remarkable feat of legal translation. If such an
extensive grant were actually made, it would be conferring
equitable powers with a vengeance upon an inferior court.
A more reasonable view is that the provision is a vesting of
jurisdiction subject to legislative definition and delimitation
appearing elsewhere.
It hardly seems possible that, prior to 1895, this pro-
vision as to testamentary trustees could be regarded as any-
thing but unconstitutional, under the cases of Davenport v.
Caldwell,31 Poole v. Brown,32 and Thomas v. Poole.
33 If it
29. Rev. Stat. 1873, 573, Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 39.
30. Gen. Stat. 1882, Code Civ. Proc., Tit. 4, Sec. 38.
31. Note 2 supra.
32. Note 10 supra.
33. Note 5 supra.
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had been constitutional, the last two cases (which are dis-
cussed under Question I) would have taken a different turn,
by drawing upon that section. Since 1895, however, it may
be that the provision, although enacted prior thereto, is no
longer ineffectual if we accept Bradford v. Richardson34 as
permitting the legislature to confer powers upon the Probate
Court in fields not related to matters testamentary, etc.
Of more than ordinary interest is the fact that, except
perhaps for Thomas v. Poole35-in which that part of the
section with which we are here concerned may or may not
have been the one the court had in mind-there appears to
be no construction of, or reference to, it in any case; and
we are thus without any judicial light on its meaning and
scope.
In order to parallel testamentary trustees with executors
and administrators under this section, it would virtually be
necessary to use "trustee" interchangeably with "executor"
and "administrator" whenever these latter terms appear in
the statute. In view of the differences of functions between
the offices, such a process is hardly reasonable or likely; and
the same deduction should be arrived at even where the duties
of personal representatives, or the Probate Court's powers
over them, are formulated as a matter of common law.
If it is necessary to find plenary power in order to raise
Probate Court jurisdiction over trustees to the level of its
authority over executors and administrators, the process will,
paradoxically, give that court even more extensive authority
and a more constant and enduring supervision over trustees
than over personal representatives. Administrators take no
title to real estate, although it is their duty to report and in-
ventory it; and, in case of a deficiency of personal assets
to subject it to sale; but, -with the real estate as such, he
has nothing to do and nothing to account for. He does not
collect or account for rents, nor can he maintain actions
against third persons-for the heirs have the title. Executors
have no title to real estate either, except when, infrequently,
it is devised directly to them; and they have no concern with
or control over the testator's realty except to report and in-
ventory it and to resort to it to pay debts when personal
34. Note 6 supra.
35. Note 5 supra.
29
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property is insufficient, or where they are given a power of
sale. The title being in the devisees, they do not, just as their
counterparts in intestacy, collect or account for rents, or
maintain actions against third persons. Thus, the Probate
Court's supervisory powers are confined to the extent that the
executor or administrator is limited by the nature of the
property. But the usual trust being one of real as well as of
personal property, the trustee has title to both; or, in a given
case it may be a trust of one or the other. In any event, if
it is a trust of real property, the Probate Court-if it has
jurisdiction-would supervise the conduct of the holder of
that legal title. Compared to the duties of the trustee, the
duties of an executor or administrator are simple indeed:
their functions are limited to collection, payment, and dis-
tribution, while those of the trustee usually go far on beyond
such items. Too, the period of the administration of the de-
cedent's estate, unless it is heavily involved in debt, is usually
of brief duration; but the trust takes up where the adminis-
tration leaves off in the case of personal property; it starts
at once with real property; and whether it is of one or the
other or both, its duration is usually measured in terms of
lives in being plus.
An even more paradoxical situation develops if we ascribe
plenary powers to the Probate Court: it will actually have a
firmer grasp on the testamentary trustee than the court of
equity itself. If we assume that, in a given case, on the pro-
bate of a will the Probate Court assumes jurisdiction of the
trustee named in the will-as it does over the personal rep-
resentative on the inception of the administration of an
estate; and, or, if we assume that the trustee must periodi-
cally account to that court, then from that moment the
trustee is in court and subject at all times thereafter to that
tribunal's authority. The point is, that a trustee is subject to
the control and supervision of a court of equity, but, unless
that court has actually appointed him, he may never appear
before, have contact with, or account to, it unless he is
brought into it by litigation; and when that is concluded,
the court has nothing further to do with him until perhaps
another court action. The trustee, merely because he is a
trustee, does not fall within the working control of the court
of equity, and, in fact, the court may never hear of him. But
with the probate of a will in which a trustee is named-if we
18
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accept the analogy to the personal representative-the ma-
chinery of that court is at once set in motion to handle the
trustee then and until the termination of the trust: a con-
tinuous and unbroken contract to the end.
One last question about Section 209 may be asked here:
Is there significance in the fact that the language is "juris-
diction over trustees", and not over trusts? Is it possible
that it was intended that the Probate Court should confine
itself to supervising the conduct of trustees and should have
no control over the trust property-in other words, that the
trustee should account for his acts under the trust, and with
this aspect alone should the Probate Court concern itself?
The writer does not suggest an answer, but the question does
offer some interesting angles, which are discussed later. See
the comment under 2 (a) and 2 (d) of Question II.
(2) Have you construed this Section in actual cases be-
fore you, or do you now interpret it, as giving the Probate
Court power to:
(a) Appoint a trustee where the will creates a trust,
but no trustee is named, or the trustee named cannot or
will not act? (Such an appointment would be similar to
the designation of an administrator c. t. a.).
17 answered yes; 5 answered no. Of those answering
yes, 3 stated that they had so acted in reliance upon this
section.
Comment: The power of the Probate Court to appoint
administrators c. t. a. is regulated by statute3, but the power
itself is probably inherent in the nature of the general duties
of the Probate Judge. The import of the statute is to prescribe
the method by which the appointment is to be made, and
the circumstances under which it is to be had. Of course,*
no attempt can be made to fit the incapacitated or unwilling
truptee, or the unnamed or nonexistent one, into the statute.
The power of the court of equity to name a trustee where
none is named, or where the one named cannot or will not
accept the trust, is elemental-under the familiar maxim that
36. Sec. 8951, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee3
A testamentary trust is no exception. But, for a Probate
Court to undertake to carry out this important prerogative,
it would be necessary that Section 209 be construed to confer
upon that court as full and ample power as that possessed
by the court of equity. Such a belief is hiardly to be enter-
tained seriously. And the absence of any specific statutory
provision dealing with the situation is not without signifi-
cance, since it seems improbable that if the legislature in-
tended to give this particular power to Probate Courts, it
would not have made express provision for it.
Whether the jurisdiction conferred by the words of the
section in question is limited or unlimited, the words them-
selves may prevent the Probate Court from naming a trustee
where none is named or where the one named renounces the
trust or cannot accept it. The language is "jursidiction in re-
lation to trustees appointed by will" (italics supplied). The
language is not "trusts created by will", which might cover
the case. If no trustee is appointed by will, there is no one
over whom the Probate Judge is to take jurisdiction; and if
he undertakes to name one, that person is not one who has
been appointed by will. If the person named in the will does
not: or cannot accept, it is as if no trustee had been named,
and, certainly, over that non-accepting person the Probate
Judge would have no authority; and, likewise if the judge
appointed someone, the appointee would be his own and not
the one named in the will. True, a court of equity can name
a trustee in these cases, but that court has jurisdiction over
trusts-the property, the fiduciary, and the relationship.
(b) Accept the resignation of a testamentary trustee?
17 answered yes; 5 answered no. Of those answering
yes, 2 stated that they had accepted resignations, justifying
it under Section 209.
Comment: According to the weight of authority, a Pro-
bate Court is not, in the absence of the statute, authorized to
accept the resignation of either an administrator or execu-
37. Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 33, 101; E Parte Mayrant, Rich-
ardson's Equity Cases 1 (1831); Withers v. Jenkins, 6 S. C. 122
(1874) ; Leaphart v. Harmon, 186 S. C. 362, 195 S. E. 628 (1938).
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tor.33 This seems to be the law in South Carolina, except as
changed by statute, as hereinafter noted. There are no cases
involving an administrator's resignation, but the authorities
elsewhere generally indicate that no distinction is to be made
in this regard between administrators and executors. Of this
latter class, the South Carolina cases make it plain that
neither the Probate Court nor the court of equity has power
to consider the proferred resignation of that representative.3
These cases all antedate the passage of the following amend-
ment to the statute dealing with administrators c. t. a.:40
"The Probate Judge may accept the resignation of the
executors when in his opinion such resignation will not
be injurious to the estate, and in such cases he shall
appoint an administrator or administrators with the will
annexed as in case of failure to qualify."
Thus, executors are, by this enactment, permitted to re-
sign. Whether the same power can be exercised concurrently
by the court of common pleas is questionable. No similar
provision is to be found in the statutes covering the resig-
nation of administrators, and the law, presumably, continues
to be that such representatives may not resign. Since the
matter has not been definitely passed upon in the state, the
writer is not committing himself to a flat assertion that the
Probate Court-which appoints administrators-may not ac-
cept their resignation. It may be, too, that the offer of an ad-
ministrator to resign would, if refused, work an injury to the
estate which he represents, in that he would be an unwilling
-and hence an unsuitable-administrator; and that such a
tender of resignation ought to be treated as a removal to be
made by the Probate Court.
Of trustees, testamentary and otherwise, the law is differ-
ent. The cases, generally, support the view that the court of
equity has the inherent power to act upon and accept the
resignation of a trustee, and this without regard to whether
38. 23 C.J. 1014; 21 Am. Jur. 457; 91 A.L.R. 712.
39. Haigood v. Wells, I Hill's Equity 59 (1833); Osborn v. Black,
Speers' Equity 431 (1844); Campbell v. Bank of Charleston, 3 S. C.
348 (1871) ; Chapman v. City Council, 30 S. C. 549, 9 S. E. 591, 3 L.R.A.
311 (1888).
40. 29 Stat. 701 (1916), now in Sec. 8951, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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or not the beneficiaries consent.' Of course, the trustee, as a
condition of the acceptance of his resignation, must properly
account. The South Carolina cases put the matter this way:
"A trustee once invested with the duties of his office
can only be released in one of three ways: 1. By assent
of all his cestuis que trust, capable of consent; 2. By
means of some special power creating the trust; 3. By
an application to the Court of Chancery."42
Some doubt has been present in South Carolina, however,
since an early date as to the inherent capacity of a court of
equity to discharge a trustee upon his resignation. The mat-
ter was supposedly resolved, in 1796, by the passage of an
Act,43 the preamble of which is as follows: "Whereas, doubts
exist whether the Court of Equity have power to permit
trustees to resign their trusts with the consent of the parties
entitled to the use of the trust estate, and to substitute other
persons to support the trust". The Act, as well as its present
successor, provides, in substance, that where the beneficiaries
are willing to have a trustee substituted for the trustee who
is acting, the "Court of Equity" (the present Code section
uses the term "Court of Common Pleas") shall have the
power to substitute a trustee, and by operation of law the
new trustee shall be vested with the title and powers of the
old one. There is a proviso that a memorandum of the change
shall be made on the record of the deed of trust or with the
will, as the case may be. Whether this mode of court action-
acceptance of resignation and substitution-is limited to cases
where the beneficiaries are willing for the change, and
whether the method of resignation marked out by the section
is exclusive, is open to some question." Suffice it to say, the
resignation statute, if it does not merely declare the law,
does at least afford recourse to a court of equity for the sub-
mission of a resignation by a trustee.
41. 65 C. J. 612; 54 Am. Jur. 111; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
Sec. 514; Scott on Trusts, Secs. 106, 106.1; Restatement of Trusts,
Sec. 106.
42. DuRant v. DuRant, 36 S. C. 49, 14 S. E. 391 (1891); Nobles
v. Hogg, 36 S. C. 322, 15 S. E. 359 (1891); Kolb v. Booth, 80 S. C. 501,
61 S. E. 942 (1908).
43. 5 Stat. 277, now Sec. 9046, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
44. See Morrow v. Odom, 14 S. C. 623 (1880).
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There is no statute specifically giving the Probate Judge
the power to act upon the resignation of a testamentary
trustee. The only statute-and it has been discussed-which
speaks of the resignation of a trustee states that application
shall be made to the Court of Common Pleas. Unless, again,
the Probate Court, under Section 209, is vested with all the
powers of a court of chancery, it is difficult to support a
conclusion that it can act upon a resignation. And even if,
improbably, the Probate Court is so vested, and if the ex-
clusive method to effect the resignation is that described by
the Act of 1796, just adverted to, that course is limited to
the Court of Common Pleas and can be pursued nowhere
else.
(c) Remove a testamentary trustee for misconduct?
17 answered yes; 5 answered no. None of those answer-
ing yes had actually removed a trustee for misconduct un-
der the section in question.
Comment: Here, again, we must compare the power of the
Probate Court to remove administrators and executors, on
the one hand, with the power of a court of equity to remove
a trustee, on the other. When we inquire into the Probate
Court's power to remove the personal representative, we
enter into a vast area of doubt, and on this score the writer's
remarks must be treated as far from dogmatic. The texts
geenerally state that the Probate Court has exclusive juris-
diction'to revoke letters testamentary and of administration,
whether because improvidently issued in the first place or be-
cause the representative has committed such acts after un-
dertaking the administration as would justify his removal:
incompetence, neglect, mismanagement, failure to file returns,
dishonesty, hostility, adverse interest, removal from the state,
and so on.45 This jurisdiction to revoke letters in the one
case or the other is predicated upon the fact that, as it was
the Probate Court which granted letters at the outset, only
that court can revoke them.
There are statutes which, in cases specified, authorize the
Probate Judge to revoke the letters of the administrator or
1
45. 33 C. J. S. 1016; 33 C. J. S. 1030, 1040; 23 C. J. 1110, 1119; 138
Am. St. Rep. 525; Ann. Cas. 1915D 284.
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executor: Sections 9015 and 9016 of 1942 Code provide that
if an administrator or an executor changes his domicile or
is absent for ten consecutive months, he shall be cited by the
Probate Judge, and if he fails to disprove the fact of change
of domicile or absence, "in case of an administrator, the
letters of administration shall be revoked; and (in) the case
of an executor such failure shall be received as a formal
renunciation of the office, notwithstanding his previous ac-
ceptance." (Similar provision is made as to trustees: This
will be discussed later.) Section 9013 provides that in the
event of failure of the administrator or executor to make
annual returns he shall be cited to do so, and in default shall
be adjudged in contempt and a fine of $20 imposed for every
day the default continues, "and in case of such recusant ad-
ministrator or executor, he may further revoke the letters of
administration or testamentary as the case may be." Sec-
tion 2488 of the Code, a part of the inheritance tax laws,
provides that failure to file an inventory within a prescribed
time shall subject the delinquent administrator or executor
to a penalty, and, after notice and hearing, "the Probite
Court * * may remove said executor or administrator".
Whether these statutes furnish the exclusive warrant for
removal or whether they are supplemental to existing powers
or are declaratory in part of existing law, is a question that
has yet to be answered; but the writer ventures the opinion
that these statutes are not exclusive in the sense that the
personal representative cannot be removed unless he has
committed one of the acts specified in the statutes.
The cases are numerous which hold that the Probate
Judge has power to revoke letters-testamentary or of ad-
ministration-which have been improperly obtained or in-
providently issued. Thus, where letters of administration have
been issued to one who the Judge of Probate afterwards duly
concludes was not entitled to them, he may recall those let-
ters.46 And where letters of administration have been issued
on a supposedly intestate estate but which is actually a tes-
tate one, the later probating of the will will have the effect, and
46. Thompson v. Hucket, 2 Hill's Law 347 (1834); Smith v. Wingo,
Rice's Law 287 (1839); Ex Parte Crafts, 28 S. C. 281, 5 S. E. 718
(1887); Ex Parte White, note 12 supra; Ex Parte Jones, 102 S. C.
110, 86 S. E. 203 (1915); Ellenberg v. Arthur, 178 S. C. 490, 183 S. E.
306, 103 A.L.R. 437 (1935).
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the Probate Judge may so declare, of voiding the first ad-
ministration and nullifying the prior grant of letters. 47 Simi-
larly, where letters testamentary are issued in conjunction
with the probate of a will, and a later revoking will is there-
after probated, the effect of the later probate is to void the
first and to carry with it the annulment of the earlier letters,
which the Probate Judge may evidence by a formal revoca-
tion. 48 And, without citing authorities, where a will is set
aside, in a contest attacking its validity, the effect is to de-
stroy the probate and the grant of letters testamentary.
Strictly speaking, all -these are cases of revocation and
not of removal, the former term being generally employed
to denote the voiding based on facts attendant to the
original grant of letters; whereas, in removal, the action is
based on facts growing out of the conduct of the repre-
sentative after he has qualified. In the first situation the
court's act is based on the determination that letters should
not have been given in the beginning; in the other, the de-
termination is that while the letters may have properly been
issued, the representative, by his later conduct, should not
be allowed to keep them.
In the case of administrators, the law seems to be that the
Probate Court, from which that representative derives his
authority may, for cause, remove;9 and the rationale of
this power of removal by the Probate Court is to be found
in the source of the administrator's authority-which, as
it can appoint, ought to be allowed to remove. But with re-
spect to the removal of executors, the law is not so clear, at
least in this state. While, as has been noted,50 the authorities
as a whole sustain the proposition that the Probate Court
may remove an executor, just as it may remove an admin-
istrator, there is a surprising dearth of South Carolina
authorities on the point. In fact, there is no clear-cut case,
so far as this writer is able to discover, that squarely puts the
47. Benson v. Rice, 2 Nott & McCord 577 (1820); Foster v. Brown,
1 Bailey's Law 221, 19 Am. Dec. 672 (1829) ; Price v. Nesbitt, 1 Hill's
Equity 445 (1834); In re Mears, 75 S. 0. 482, 56 S. E. 7, 9 Ann.
Cas. 960 (1906).
48. Vance v. Davenport, 11 Richardson's Law 517 (1858).
49. McLaurin v. Thompson, Dudley's Law 335 (1838); Norton v.
Wallace, 1 Richardson's Law 507 (1845).
50. See note 45 supra.
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point in issue. But there is one case, decided by the United
States Supreme Court, in which Chief Justice Marshall
wrote the opinion, involving a South Carolina will, which
may throw light on the subject. In Griffith v. Frazer,5' the
court was dealing with a will probated in South Carolina by
an executor who qualified but who thereafter left the state;
the Ordinary then granted letters of administration to an-
other. The court held the latter grant void, saying:
"The letters testamentary, when once granted, are
not revocable by the Ordinary. He cannot annul them,
or transfer the legal interest of the executor to any
other person. His rights are beyond the reach of the
Ordinary."62
The G-riffith case has not received any adverse criticism
in any subsequent South Carolina case, and it was cited with
approval in Blakeley v. Frazier.53 There, a testator appointed
his son executor and provided that if he should fail to qualify,
his two sons-in-law should act. The son qualified as executor,
and thereafter the Probate Judge granted letters testamen-
tary to one of the sons-in-law. The court disapproved, saying:
"No doubt the Probate Court has 'jurisdiction in letters
testamentary and of administration'; and no doubt this
includes the appointment of administrators in case of
intestacy, and the granting of letters testamentary in
cases of testacy. * * *
"So, too, the Probate Court has jurisdiction to grant
letters testamentary, but this is not an unlimited power.
He has no authority or jurisdiction to nominate and ap-
point an executor. This power belongs alone to the tes-
tator. The Probate Court has the power to clothe the
executor appointed by the will with legal authority
to act; but to allow him to disregard the nomination
51. 8 Cranch 9, 3 L. Ed. 471 (1814).
52. The court bases its opinion in part on the South Carolina case
of Ford v. Travis, a MS. decision of the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals, dealing apparently with a similar set of facts. The writer has
not been able to locate this unreported case.
The right to remove an executor or administrator who, after quali-
fying, removes from the state is now given to the Probate Court by
Sees. 9015, 9016, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
53. 20 S. C. 144 (1883).
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss1/6
REVIEW SECTION
in the will, and upon a new motion make a new appoint-
ment would be monstrous; and wherever he attempts
to do such a thing, it should be utterly disregarded as an
unwarranted assumption of power."
The language just quoted may furnish the basis for the
drawing of a distinction between the power to remove an
administrator in the one case and a possible denial of the
power to remove an executor in the other; since, in the first,
the administrator derives his authority solely from the Pro-
bate Court, and, in the second, the executor derives his
authority from the will, and the naming of an administrator
d. b. n. c. t. a. would amount to the naming of an executor
by someone other than the testator.
No without significance are two statutes which have been
previously mentioned: Section 8951 dealing with the resig-
nation of the executor, which speaks of the appointment of
an administrator c. t. a. "as in case of failure to qualify";
and Section 9016, dealing with absent fiduciaries, calling for
revocation of letters of administration in intestacy, and in the
case of an executor, "such failure shall be received as a formal
renunciation of his office." These statutes may reveal a think-
ing along the line that letters testamentary cannot be re-
voked, and that a pre-qualification status-i.e., renunciation
-must be resorted to as a substitute.
There are many cases, it is true, in which the removal of
an executor is mentioned and discussed, but they are cases
in equity. It was early held that a court of equity did not
have the power to remove an executor, but that it could ap-
point a receiver for the estate.54 There may be an inference
here that the reason for equity's declination of that power
is the presence of that power exclusively in some other court
-in the Court of Ordinary or Probate Court; but there is
never a specific statement to that effect. It is singular that if
the Court of Ordinary, or the Probate Court, had the power to
remove an executor, recourse was not had to that court; but
that, on the contrary, the intervention of equity should, in
so many cases, be sought. There are passages in these equity
cases that speak of the removal by the court of equity of an
executor for misconduct, but none of the orders of the court
54. Haigood v. Wells, note 39 supra; Ex Parte Galluchat, 1 Hill's
Equity 148 (1833).
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undertook actually to remove the executor; what actually hap-
pened was that a receiver was appointed, who did not oust
the executor from his office but prevented his exercise of it.M
The explanation is thus given in Gadsden v. Whaley :56
"An executor holds his letters testamentary from the
Judge of Probate, an officer of the law, but his appoint-
ment is by the testator himself. It seems that under the
Act of 1869 * * * the Judge of Probate, under certain
circumstances, may discharge an executor upon his own
application; but we think it has always been held in this
state that the court of equity has not the power to re-
move an executor by the appointment of a receiver or
otherwise * * *
"In a proper case the court will appoint a receiver
who is an executive officer-the hand of the court-to
administer the assets of the estate under the direction
of the court, which may, for the purpose of preserving
the property, restrain the executor from meddling with
the management of the estate, and compel him to give
up the control of it to the receiver; but such appoint-
ment and administration do not remove the executor or
destroy his character as the legal representative of the
estate. * * * "
Except, then, as the statutes specifically authorize the re-
moval of an executor-and these have been noted-the com-
petence of the Probate Court to remove that representative
is extremely doubtful; and the power of a court of equity to
remove is not admissible except through the equally, and per-
haps more, efficacious medium of the appointment of a re-
ceiver.
These extended, and confessedly extraneous, observations
on the removal power of a Probate Court over administrators
and executors serve, nevertheless, to point up the nebulous
character of that court's authority and to suggest the com-
55. Edmonds v. Cranshaw, Harper's Equity 224 (1824); Stanley v.
Rabe, McMullan's Equity 22 (1840); Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S. C.
396 (1882); Anderson v. Butler, 31 S. C. 183, 9 S. E. 797, 5 L. R. A.
166 (1889); Harman v. Wagner, 33 S. C. 487, 12 S. E. 98 (1890);
Smith v. Heyward, 115 S. C. 145, 105 S. E. 275 (1920). But see Tindall
v. Sublett, 82 S. C. 199, 63 S. E. 960 (1908).
56. 14 S. C. 210 (1880).
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plexities that would entangle an effort to equate the removal
of trustees with the removal of administrators and executors.
The innate power of a court of equity to remove a trustee,
testamentary or otherwise, is not to be denied. Its exercise
needs no support from statutes, and the general authorities
and local cases abundantly support equity's power to remove
the miscreant trustee5. To give this sweeping power of re-
moval to the Probate Court-a power more extensive and
certain than that which that court has in the exercise of its
traditional functions-would call, again, for an assumtion
that Section 209 gives plenary power. Without that assump-
tion the authority, of course, cannot be asserted. The grounds
for removal-predicated on injury to the trust estate-are
varied and numerous. Is it to be concluded that even without
statutes expressly giving the power to remove on general or
stated grounds,58 the Probate Court is to be clothed with an
all embracing power to remove, capable of being invoked in
a multitude of situations?
(d) Appoint a successor trustee in the event of the death,
resignation or removal of a testamentary trustee?
17 answered yes; 5 answered no. Of those answering yes,
one stated that he had actually made such an appointment.
Comment: The process of the Probate Court in the filling
of a vacancy caused by the death, removal or resignation of
an administrator or executor is the appointment of an ad-
ministrator d. b. n. or an administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. The
matter is covered in part by Section 8971 of the Code of 1942,
which authorizes the grant of letters of administration
d. b. n.: "where a sole surviving executor or administrator
shall die, the estate in his hands not having been fully ad-
ministered." This statute has been held not to be exclusive
for the circumstances under which such an administration
57. 65 C. J. 614; 54 Am. Jur. 111, 440; Restatement o Trusts,
Sec. 107; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 107; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
Sec. 519; Cooper v. Day, 1 Richardson's Equity 26 (1844); Gibbes v.
Smith, 2 Richardson's Equity 131 (1846); Dickerson v. Smith, 17 S. C.
289 (1881); Tindall v. Sublett, note 55 supra; Smith v. Heyward,
note 55 supra; Crayton v. Fowler, 140 S. C. 517, 139 S. E. 161 (1927).
58. There are some, it is true-and they will be discussed hereafter
-but they are extremely limited in scope. Secs. 2488, 9015, 9016, S. C.
Code of Laws 1942.
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is to be had. In McNair v. Howle, 59 an estate which had been
closed by the discharge of the administrator was reopened
with the grant of letters d. b. n., in the face of an objection
that, only in the event of the death of the representative be-
fore completion of administration, could such renewing ad-
ministration be had. The court, referring to what is now Sec-
tion 8971, declared:
"The duty thus expressly imposed upon the Probate
Court in the case of the death of the executor or admin-
istrator does not, as we apprehend, deprive that court
of its plenary jurisdiction, under the broad constitutional
and statutory powers conferred upon it * * * to appoint
an administrator de bonis non, if otherwise proper, when-
ever the vacancy occurs in the official representation of
a decedent's estate, whether due to death, revocation of
letters, discharge, or other cause."
Obviously, the substitution by the Probate Court of a trus-
tee in. place of one named in a will cannot be ingested into the
de bonis non processes of the Probate Court. If the power
to substitute trustees can be exercised, it can only be by reason
of a transfer of equity powers to that court; and that, it is
clear, can take place only if plenary powers are conferred-
as to which, again, the writer expresses his skepticism. The
power of substitution by a court of equity is, of course, a
commonplace, no matter what the cause for the vacancy:
death,60 removal, 61 or resignation 2 .
In Thomas v. Poole,63 previously discussed, it will be re-
called that it was held that the appointment by the Probate
Judge of a trustee to succeed one who had died was improper,
but the decision was on constitutional grounds. Of course, at
the time of the decision the holding was manifestly correct;
but today, if the question is not one of constitutionality, but
of the scope of existing statutes, the authority of that case
has no vitality.
59. Note 14 supra.
60. Among others, Ex Parte Knust, Bailey's Equity 489 (1831);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 61 S. C. 243, 39 S. E. 391 (1901); Cone v.
Cone, 61 S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 748 (1901).
61. See authorities in note 57 supra.
62. See authorities in note 42 supra, and Sec. 9046, S. C. Code of
Laws 1942.
63. Note 5 supra, and text to note 27 supra.
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The same observation may be made here as was made in.
the concluding portion of the comment in sub-question 2 (a).
If a vacancy occurs in the trusteeship and the Probate Judge
appoints a substitute, can that substitute be one of the "trus-
tees appointed by will" over whom Probate Judge is given
jurisdiction? The same possible objection can be interposed:*
the trustee whom the Probate Judge names is not the one
appointed by the will, and it is only over the latter that the
section purports to confer authority. This may seem to be run-
ning literalism and logic into the ground, but the purpose
of all this discussion is as much to point out incongruities,
ambiguities and strange possibilities as it is to argue on pol-
icy and meaning and probable intent.
(e) Construe a will in order to determine the powers
and duties of the testamentary trustee?
14 answered yes; 7 answered no; 1 did not answer. In
answering no, 1 judge stated that he could construe the will
to determine whether a trust had been created in order to
-pass on the propriety of the executor's transferring property
over to the alleged trustee.
Comment: It is a familiar statement that the Probate
Court is not a court of construction. The proposition, how-
ever, is not exactly accurate. What is meant and must be
taken. as correct, is that, on probate, the court is not a court
of construction. In determining whether a will ought to be
admitted to probate, what the court is concerned with is not
what the effect, operation, or meaning of the provisions of
the will may be,64 but only whether the instrument propounded
is the voluntarily and properly executed will of a competent
testator, aware of its contents. Conversely, when a will, hav-
ing been proved, is before a court-Probate or other-in a
:matter calling for construction, inquiries touching on the va-
lidity of the will are precluded, since such considerations have
been concluded on probate and to raise them would be in
64. Tygart v. Peeples, 9 Richardson's Equity 46 (1856); Jolliffe v.
Fanning, 10 Richardson's Law 186 (1856); Craig v. Beatty, 11 S. C.
375 (1878); Prater v. Whittle, 16 S. C. 40 (1881); Burkett v.
Whittemore, 36 S. C. 428, 15 S. E. 616 (1891); Ex Parte King, 132
S. C. 63; 128 S. E. 850 (1925); Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S. C. 136,
128 S. E. 841 (1925); Davis v. Davis, note 14 supra.
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the nature of a collateral attack.5 But the duty of a Probate
Judge does not stop with the probating of the will: he is
charged with the duty of supervising the administration of
the estate; and he must, therefore, in order to determine
whether the executor is carrying out his duties properly, read
and construe the will. To that extent, can he, as an incident
to his general jurisdiction over administration, construe a
will.6 While he can pass on the propriety of the executor's
acts after that fiduciary has performed them, the Probate
Judge cannot, it seems, undertake to advise and instruct an
executor beforehand as to his powers and duties. That pre-
rogative is given to a court of equity.67
It is elemental that a court of equity may construe a will,
not merely for the guidance of the executor, but to determine
the rights and interests of the parties taking under the will
-not as an abstract matter in the latter case, but to settle
any controversy; and, in f~ct construction may be involved
in actions at law.68 Moreover, both under the old Declaratory
Judgment Statute 9 and the present Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act,7 0 a declaratory judgment, taking the form of
construction, may be had.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to construe wills in
which a trust has been created is clear, not only under the
declaratory judgment acts referred to, but as an inherent
element in the pattern of its operation. This is particularly
true when the trustee seeks guidance and instruction where
65. Rosborough v. Hemphill, 5 Richardson's Equity 95 (1852); Hem-
bree v. Bolton, note 64 supra; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, note 14 supra.
66. 69 C. J. 860; 34 C. J. S. 969. Cf. Youmans v. West, 203 S. C. 480,
28 S. E. (2d) 47 (1943).
67. Black v. Blakely, 2 McCord's Equity 1 (1827); James v. Spann,
35 S. C. 614, 14 S. E. 955 (1891); Smith v. Heyward, 110 S. C. 148,
96 S. E. 389 (1918); Wingard v. Hennessee, 206 S. C. 159, 33 S. E.
(2d) 390 (1944); Page on Wills (5th Ed.) Sec. 1603. And, it seems,
in some cases he is under a duty to apply to a court for instructions.
Beacham v. Ross, note 15 supra.
68. Page on Wills (5th Ed.) See. 1602.
69. See. 660, S. C. Code of Laws 1942. For a proceeding under this
statute involving a will, see Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, note 14 supra.
70. Acts 1948 (45 Stat.) 2014.
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he is reasonably in doubt as to his duties and powersT The
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act72 specifically covers the
case of the trustee seeking instructions, but it does not assign
the court to which application is to be made, referring only
to "courts of record within their respective jurisdictions."
If jurisdiction over testamentary trustees is devolved upon
the Probate Court, it would follow that that court would in-
herit the broad equitable power of advising the trustee before
he has acted,-a power which it cannot exercise at the behest
of a personal representative. But even if the jurisdiction is
a limited one-confined to scrutiny of the trustee's adminis-
tration, principally the rendering of accounts-the conse-
quence would be that the Probate Judge, in order to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the trustee's duties, must con-
strue the will just as he must incidentally do with respect
to an executor's duties. One of the Probate Judges, in answer-
ing yes to this question, gave as his reason, "because the
conduct of the trustee would be subject to my approval." The
answer is unassailable, if it is once assumed that the trustee's
acts are subject to the discipline of the Probate Court.
All trusts are not complicated, but there are many prob-
lems in them-and they are not unusual-that a Probate
Judge does not encounter in his supervision of executors.
It is true that many wills present difficult problems of con-
struction where no trust has been created, and some of these
problems are duplicates of trust problems, but their place
will usually be found in devises of land, with which the exec-
utor usually has nothing to do-and because of which, cor-
respondingly, the Probate Judge has a restricted range of
construction. But with a trust of personalty or of land-with
which if he has any jurisdiction at all he must contend-he
may be faced with features and problems like these: the dura-
tion of the trust; the active or passive character of the trust;
the Rule Against Perpetuities; conditions and contingencies
attached to the vesting or enjoyment of the trust property;
the various types of trusts-discretionary, blended, spend-
71. Restatement of Trusts, See. 259; 65 C. J. 680; Boggs v. Reid,
3 Richardson's Law 450 (1829); Snelling v. McCreary, 14 Richardson's
Equity 291 (1868); Fraser v. Davie, 11 S. C. 56 (1878); O'Cain v.
O'Cain, 51 S. C. 348, 29 S. E. 68 (1897) ; Lemmon v. Wilson, 205 S. C.
297, 31 S. E. (2d) 745 (1944); Wingard v. Hennessee, note 67 supra.
72. Note 70 supra.
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thrift, trusts for education, for support, etc.; the allocation
of receipts and expenditures to income or principal; the rights
of beneficiaries inter se; the duties, powers, and liabilities
of trustees; the distinction between the exercise of powers by
a sole trustee, on the one hand, and co-trustees, on the other.
A construction of any of these things must be preceded by
a determination whether there was a trust at all: whether
the language used is precatory or mandatory; whether, when
the same person is named both executor and trustee, the
nature of the duties imposed is such that a true trust is cre-
ated. And if the trust is a charitable trust, he will have a
new set of problems to grapple with and, at times, different
rules. The contemplation of the Probate Judge poring over
the will to resolve these matters-at once both ponderous and
gossamer-is awesome and forbidding, more to the judge than
to anyone else. But if he has jurisdiction, then it is his busi-
ness to attend to it, and he shall have to do the best he can.
III
Section 9015 of the Code provides as follows:
"When any executor or administrator has since the
grant of letters testamentary or of administration, or any
trustee, guardian of minors, committee of lunatics and
persons non compos mentis, changed his domicile to a
place beyond the limits of this State, or has been absent
from the State for ten consecutive months then last past,
and such change or absence is made to appear to the satis-
faction of the Judge of Probate of the county wherein
the letters were granted or appointment made, it shall
be the duty of such Judge of Probate to cite such execu-
tor or administrator, trustee, guardian of minors, com-
mittee of lunatics and persons non compos mentis, to
account in person before him on a day named in the cita-
tion, which shall not be less than sixty days from the
date thereof, and such citation shall be served upon such
absent executor or administrator, trustee, guardian of
minors, committee of lunatics and persons non compos
mentis, by publication forthwith, once a week for four
weeks, in the newspaper in which the.said Judge of Pro-
bate publishes his official advertisements, and a copy
shall be mailed to such absent executor or administrator,
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trustee, guardian of minors, committee of lunatics and
persons non compos mentis, at his or her or their place
of residence, if it is known or can with reasonable dili-
gence be ascertained."
Section 9016 of the Code provides as follows:
"If, upon such citation, such absent executor or ad-
ministrator, trustee, guardian of minors, committee of
lunatics and persons non compos mentis, fail to appear
upon the day named and render a return of his admin-
istration up to date, or, appearing by attorney, fail to
disprove a change of domicile and continuous absence
for ten months next preceding the date of citation, in
the case of an administrator, the letter of. administra-
tion shall be revoked; and the case of an executor, such
failure shall be received as a formal renunciation of the
office, notwithstanding his previous acceptance; and in
case of any trustee, committee, or guardian, the appoint-
ment shall be revoked and annulled."
(1) Have you ever removed a testamentary trustee under
these two Sections?
22 answered no; but 1 said he "is getting ready to do it".
(2) If you have not removed a testamentary trustee, is
it your present opinion that you can properly remove him
under these Sections?
22 answered yes; 1 stated he would remove only if his
court had appointed the trustee.
Comment: In the two statutes set out above, we have a
specific act of the trustee mentioned as a cause for Probate
Court action. Presumably the trustee referred to is a testa-
mentary trustee, although the word in itself is capable of a
larger meaning-another example of the lack of precision that
appears throughout. The unanimity of negative answers in
(1) is a tribute to-or, at least, a token of-the permanence
and immobility of resident trustees.
The two sections were enacted in 1878,7 and their pres-
ent language is virtually identical with that in the original
act. A similar provision is to be found in the 1942 Code, in
73. 16 Stat. 700.
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Sections 8617 and 8618, in which the language is the same,
except that it omits executors and administrators; but the
word "trustee" is repeated there. Actually, it is the same
Act of 1878, transplanted in modified form to the Article
dealing with guardians.
The wording of these statutes demands close analysis.
It is stated that when "such change or absence is made to
appear to the satisfaction of the Judge of Probate of a
county wherein the letters are granted or appointment made,"
etc. One may easily determine where letters are granted,
and where guardians and committees are appointed, but with
testamentary trustees, where is the appointment made? The
Probate Judge does not make the appointment; the testator
makes it. In a given case a Circuit Judge may make an ap-
pointment, and the county of appointment is thus made
known; but it is doubtful, to say the least, that this is the
appointment referred to. There may have been a miscon-
ception in the mind of the particular legislator who pro-
posed or prepared the legislation, which was concurred in
by the legislature in this enactment; and, if so, it is a formal
public perpetuation of error; but the error or assumption
does not make it the law that a Probate Court appoints a
testamentary trustee, even though that court has authority
in "matters testamentary". The Probate Judge no more makes
the appointment of a testamentary trustee by acceptance of
the will for probate than, in the case of an inter vivos trust
represented by deed, the Clerk of Court or Register of Mesne
Conveyance appoints the trustee on recording the deed.
One may object ,that there is a vital difference: in the one
case there is a judge, in the other, a mere clerk--that the
admission of a will to probate is a judicial act, the recording
of a deed a ministerial one. But we may go up to the level
of the Probate Judge, and say that the admission of the will
to probate is no more an appointment than the entertaining
of an action by or against the trustee of an inter vivos or
testamentary trust in the Court of Common Pleas constitutes
an appointment by that court.
The only statute that confers unon the Probate Court
the power to appoint a trustee is one which deals with the
divestment of the dower of an insane married woman ;74 and
74. Sec. 8598, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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such a trustee is, manifestly, not a testamentary trustee.
The concluding clause of Section 9016 declares: "and in
case of any trustee, committee, or guardian, the appointment
shall be revoked and annulled." It will be observed that with
respect to an administrator, it is provided elsewhere that
his letters shall be revoked; as to an executor, he is to be
treated as if he had renounced his office; as to guardians
and committees their appointment shall be revoked and an-
nulled. In every one of these situations the penalizing pro-
visions make sense. Each of them presupposes a prior act
by the Probate Court, which, is now being undone. But with
a trustee, it is impossible to conceive of the unmaking of an
appointment that has never been made; and it is hardly
open to suggestion that the testator's designation of the
trustee is the appointment referred to.
There is no provision in the Code, nor is it case law,
that a trustee must take an oath before the Probate Court
or any other court to qualify or to enter upon his duties.
These requirements are present with the other fiduciaries
who are answerable to the Probate Court. Nor is there to be
found anywhere a provision calling for the issuance of letters
of trusteeship, corresponding to the letters of administration,
testamentary, or of guardianship-as in those cases it is
either expressly provided for by statute or is assumed as
an incident of the traditional powers of the Probate Judge.
Any issuance of "letters of trusteeship" would be an officious,
not an official, act.
The case of Carr v. Bredenburg,7 decided in 1897, nearly
twenty years after the'enactment of the two sections we are
here dealing with, points up the inutility and insignificance of
their provisions. In that case the trust had been created
under a will of a testator who had died in 1868. The surviving
trustee of the will at some later time moved out of the state
and had long been absent from it when this suit was started
in 1896. In the litigation the trust property was sold. One of
the questions which arose was whether the trust proceeds
should be transferred to the now non-resident trustee, and,
effectually, whether she should not be removed because of her
non-residence. The Supreme Court held that the fact that
the trustee had left the state was not in itself sufficient to
75. 50 S. C. 471, 27 S. E. 925 (1897).
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forbid the transfer of the trust money to her; that to refuse
such payment was "practically to remove the trustee from
office." The court concluded that, in order to protect the fund,
the trustee should furnish bond with local sureties, conditioned
upon the proper discharge of her duties and against removal
of the fund from the jurisdiction. Now, if this case means
anything, (and it was decided after 1895--so that the con-
stitutional feature of the question is academic), it is that,
as a matter of law, removal of a testamentary trustee from
the state is not an automatic cause for ouster. (Can it be
possible that in Charleston county, in which the case arose
and in which the trust was administered, there can be a recon-
ciliation of the statute and the decision, if we accept the view
that the Charleston Probate Court has no jurisdiction over
trustees? See the discussion in footnote 6.) Yet at the time
this decision was rendered, the statute calling for annulment
of the appointment of absent or domicile-changing fiduciaries
had been on the books for two decades. The statute, it -will be
noted, calls for a removal by the Probate Judge on the bare
showing of the pertinent facts, and he is not invested with
discretion to annul or not to annul. The conflict between the
statute, if it applies to testamentary trustees, and the de-
cision in the case, is plain. The case nowhere mentions the
statute. It would be extraordinary, indeed, if the court had
overlooked it. The probability is that the court knew of it and
chose to ignore it. If the statute were, in reality, applicable,
the Probate Court could, even after the decision, have ousted
the absent trustee. It is doubtful that the Probate Judge had
the temerity to take this step. If we accept the Carr case
and note the impossibility of applying the section when it
speaks of aennuling the appointment of the trustee, we must
conclude that the statute cannot reasonably be said to affect
the testamentary trustee. The presence, side by side, of a
statute declaring positively that the Probate Judge shall
remove a trustee who has left the state and a Supreme Court
decision that the Chancellor shall not remove the trustee in
such a case, creates an optical illusion that is bad for the
eyes and worse for the brain.
These statutes that we have been discussing are an un-
fortunate example of throwing in a term for good measure.
Another instance of the heedless dumping of the trustee in-
to the fiduciary pot is to be found in Section 2488 of the
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Code of 1942, which has already been mentioned.76 This
statute is a part of the inheritance tax laws, and its
purpose is to have the representative of a decedent's estate
furnish an ample detailing of the assets of the estate.
It provides that the administrator or executor shall file
at the time of his appointment a detailed statement of pre-
scribed items. Then there appear these words: "The state-
ment shall also show the name, residence, and post office
address of each executor, administrator and trustee." The
word "trustee" appears here for the first time. Then there
is a provision for the filing of an inventory in the Probate
Court by "the executor, administrator or trustee within one
month after his appointment." This is followed by a heavy
penalty provision against the "executor, administrator, or
trustee," and it is provided that the official bond of an "ex-
ecutor, administrator, or trustee" shall be liable. There is
a further provision that the Probate Court may remove the
executor or administrator (nothing is said about the trustee)
and appoint another representative, and then the Probate
Judge "shall notify the South Carolina Tax Commission * * of
the failure of any executor, administrator or trustee to file
such inventory in his office." So, again, we have the imbroglio
of the "trustee's appointment". Why, for the purposes of tax,
the trustee should file an inventory, when the executor does,
or is supposed to do, it, baffles the judgment. Furthermore,
the words "executor, administrator or trustee" are in the
alternative. Only one of three persons is contemplated. The
will is not proved by the trustee but by the ex ecutor; the exec-
utor must file the inventory; therefore, once the executor
files, the requisite is complied with and no duty rests upon
the trustee.
Pursuing this matter of the inventory further, if the
trustee is to file, will he file an inventory of the whole estate,
or merely of the trust estate? If it is the latter (and the filing
must take place within a month after appointment), how
can it reasonably be determined within that time what the
trust estate consists of? Unless it is a trust of specific real
property, chattels, or funds, the trust estate cannot be ascer-
tained until after the executor has carried out his executorial
duties. Certainly that would be true if the trust estate was
76. See the discussion under 2 (c) in the text.
39
Karesh: Probate Court Jurisdiction Over Testamentary Trusts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1949
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
of the residue; and even if the whole estate was left in trust,
it would only be what remained after the payment of debts.
There are further references to the "trustee" in the sec-
tion, but to discuss them would simply result in further en-
tanglement.
This sort of indelicate legislative treatment to which the
trustee is subjected makes one almost cry out a plea that to
every trustee there ought to be fastened a tag with the words
HANDLE WITH CARE.
IV
Section 9047 of the Code provides as follows:
"It shall be the duty of every trustee appointed by the
court to make an annual return of the estate in his pos-
session, setting out all the items of money received and
paid out, with the proper vouchers. The Judge of Probate
shall set apart certain days for the examination of such
accounts, and give notice thereof to all trustees whose
duty it shall be to account before him."
(1) Have you in actual cases before you interpreted this
Section, or do you now interpret it, as compelling testamen-
tary trustees to account to the Probate Court in the same
manner and at the same time as required of executors and
administrators?
22 answered yes; there were no negatives. 1 stated that he
compelled annual returns but doubted his power to do so.
5 stated that in actual cases they had compelled the making
of returns.
Comment: The section in question, which seems to be the
mandate upon which trustees who file returns proceed, (there
is no other section requiring trustees to account) is derived
from a comprehensive statute enacted in 1824,7 in which
the pertinent language is "and it shall be the duty of every
trustee or guardian appointed by the court, to make an an-
nual return of the estate in his possession, setting out all
the items of money received and paid out, with the proper
vouchers; and it shall be the duty of the master and com-
missioners to set apart certain days for a reference of such
77. 7 Stat. 327.
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account, to give notice thereof to all guardians and trustees
whose duty it shall be to account before them." The original
statute then goes on to penalize, not the trustees, but the
master or commissioner for failing to make reports to the
court if the beneficiary should have suffered loss by reason
of the neglect of the trustee or guardian to account annually.
The Act of 1824 was amended by the Revised Statutes
of 18737S to read as it now does, except that the words "and
guardian" appear there after the words "every trustee". The
language "appointed by the court" of the original Act is re-
tained, but the important change is the requirement to ac-
count to the Probate Judge instead of to the master or com-
missioner in equity as theretofore.
The words appointed by the court are not meaningless,
and they are of vital importance. Their significance was ex-
plained in the case of Ex Parte Mayrant,79 decided in 1831.
There, a trustee, who succeeded, by court appointment, one
who had resigned, contended that he was not required to
make returns. The court denied the validity of the contention,
saying that a return was not required of an original trustee,
but that a trustee appointed by the court was compelled-
under the Act-to make returns. The court's observations
deserve setting out:
"There was reason why the original trustee appointed
by the party should not be included in the Act. First,
the donor or creator of the trust has thought proper
to repose confidence in the trustee of his own appoint-
ment, and he had a right to annex what terms he pleased
to the trust. But the creator of the trust has nothing to
do with the substitution under the Act. * * * Though
it is said that a court has a general superintendence of
trustees, yet it does not interfere with a trustee appointed
by deed or will until he is brought before the court by
suit. When that is done, however, it will superintend
the entire execution of the trust and may provide by its
decree or order for the trustee's accounting periodically
to the Master. * * * When the trustee is appointed by
the court it is then aware of his existence and the ob-
ject of the Act was to render him amenable to the court,
78. Rev. Stat. 1873, 467, Sec. 11.
79. Note 37 supra.
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and to compel the court to superintend his conduct with-
out the necessity of any suit for that purpose."
It is clear, from this language, and from the background
of the statute, that only those trustees appointed by the court
were required to do the act called for by the statute. The
court in the Mayrant case cites the instances in which such
appointment may occur: the settlor's failure to name a
trustee; the death of the trustee; his resignation; his re-
moval for misconduct. Now, it has already been shown that
a testamentary trustee is appointed by the settlor and not
by any court, Probate or other. It must be pointed out, too,
that in the phrase "trustee appointed by the court", the
"court" referred to is not the Probate Court, because it is
the duty of the Probate Court to report to another court.
The reference, in the light of the history of the statute and
its interpretation, is to the court of equity. The Probate Court
appoints guardians, and the relevance of that court with re-
spect to requiring returns from guardians is manifest-
although, now, that is taken care of by other statutes. It
may be that the statute, in requiring trustees appointed by the
court, to report annually to the Probate Court, in effect con-
stitutes the judge of that court a quasi-Master, or, at least,
designates him to serve the same functions. But it is sufficient
to say that the language of the statute as it has been in-
terpreted, cannot be ignored; and we must conclude that a
trustee named in a will-who is not court-appointed-is un-
der no original duty to make periodic returns to the Probate
Court, or to any other court for that matter-at least, as to
the latter, in the absence of litigation.
Of course, the court of equity may, at the instance of
the beneficiary, compel the trustee to account; and, also, the
account may be brought in issue in any case involving the re-
placement of a trustee. And it seems to be the law that, in-
dependently of statute, the court-appointed trustee may be
required at any time to make an accounting. In Vincent v.
McMillan,80 a trustee who was appointed by the circuit court,
as a sort of stake-holder, in a contest between the adminis-
trator of a deceased ward and the guardian, questioned the
authority of the court to compel him to make an account-
ing, asserting that "it was not necessary or proper for the
80. 149 S. C. 229, 146 S. E. 869 (1928).
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information of the court before judgment or for any other
purpose." The trustee had made no reports to the Master.
The court spurned this contention, saying: "The trustee ap-
pointed by the court was subject to the order of the court.
It was his duty to account to the Presiding Judge, or to the
Master, on direction of the Presiding Judge, when required
to do so. The court had the right to inquire into the acts
and doings of the trustees appointed by it at any time it was
deemed proper." No mention was made in the case in Section
9047.
No cases since the amendment of the Act in 1873 ac-
tually construe the statute, although, undoubtedly, whether
properly or mistakenly, returns are made under it.
In Strauss v. U. S. F. & G. Co.8lan action touching upon
the liability by the directors of a corporate trustee to the
trustee's surety which had made good losses to the trust
eestate-the contention was made by the directors that, so
far as the surety was concerned, it was precluded by the
returns that the trustee had made to the Probate Court from
questioning the trustee's acts, on the ground that the surety
had notice through the returns of the trustee's conduct. The
court declared that such returns were not notice to the surety.
In this case the court makes bare mention of Section 9047,
speaking of it as "requiring" filing of returns. But no ques-
tion of its applicability was brought before the Court. The
corporate trustee was, in fact, a trustee appointed by the
court-and not the Probate Court-as a substitute, and the
status of the trustee could very well fit into the language
of the statute.
All in all, the section in question borders on the unintel-
ligible; but if this be strong language, let us say, more
benevolently, that it is rather confusing. The statute itself
provides no penalty-and there is no supplementing statute
for that purpose-for the failure to make a return. It is sig-
nificant that there are no punitive statutes for testamentary
trustees who fail to make returns as there are for delinquent
executors and administrators,82 and guardianss. The conse-
quence of failing to make any such return does not appear
81. 63 Fed. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 4-E. D. S. C.-1933).
82. Secs. 9012, as amended Acts 1943 (43 Stat.) 182; 9013, S. C.
Code of Laws 1942.
83. Sec. 8613, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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in the statutes, nor is there any case reported in which the
failure by a trustee to make report to the Probate Court is
touched upon.
One last question may relevantly be asked here: are
trustees of charitable trusts created by the will affected by
the statute and required to make periodic returns? There is
nothing in the books on the subject but it does not take
much imagination to envision the complexities of such ac-
countings. The charity may last forever: must the trustees
make returns in perpetuity?
The dangling character of the statute is accentuated by the
fact that the statute does not exclude, by its terms, trustees
appointed by the court in existing inter vivos trusts, nor
trustees appointed by the court in litigation where funds are
to be protected by payment to a trustee. To give a Probate
Court jurisdiction over testamentary trustees-whom it does
not appoint-and inter vivos trustees, is a large and baffling
order. For the legislature that concocted such an unappetizing
legal dish one might well call down a small plague on both its
houses.
(2) So far as you know, is it the practice of the bar of
your county, in the -representation of testamentary trustees, to
have them periodically account and make returns to your
court?
19 answered yes; 3 answered no.
Comment: The proportion of affirmative answers indi-
cates the belief, apparently, on the part of the legal com-
munity that annual returns on the part of trustees are neces-
sary. The practice is not to be condemned, although its neces-
sity, as it has been argued, is questionable. It may be however,
that, instead of actually regarding such returns to be required
by law, the lawyers who file them are merely playing safe, and,
certainly, no harm can be done by the filing. Or the state of
mind may be that there is nothing to hide and the return
may as well, on that account, be made. Or it may denote a
passion for regularity-a salutary prescription in all things.
It is the fact that corporate trustees-taking them as
a whole-make annual reports to the Probate Court. Hav-
ing, as they do, some of the most competent legal counsel
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in the state, this may reflect a conviction on the part of
these eminent probate practitioners that the filing of a return
is compulsory; but, again, such advice may be based on more
practical considerations-principally caution.
Actually, a trustee has nothing to lose and nothing much to
gain by making returns. He loses no commission, nor must he
pay any fine, when he fails to file; and, if he does file an
ex parte return, which is the customary practice, the bene-
ficiaries (as is the case with all persons affected by the ad-
ministration of estates in the Probate Court) are not bound by
it, even though the items as submitted to, and approved by, the
Probate Court are primat facie correct.84
In any event, just what would happen if such returns
are not filed is a question that cannot be precisely answered.
There is not, as has been pointed out, any forfeiture of com-
missions or imposition of a fine in the case of executors, ad-
ministrators and guardians. In Muckenfuss v. Heath,8 the
claim for commissions of a trustee named in a deed was re-
sisted on the ground that the making of regular returns
by the trustee to the Secretary of State's office was a con-
dition precedent to his allowance of commissions. The court
denied this contention, saying:
"By the executor's law, it is expressly provided,-that
executors or administrators who fail to make returns,
shall forfeit their commission. But there is no such pro-
vision in the Act we are considering * * no penalty or
disability is imposed on a * * trustee who shall fail to
return his accounts. Perhaps, if it appeared that the
estate had suffered injury from his neglect it might be
within the competency of the Court to deprive him of
commissions as a punishment. But in the present case,
it appears that the estate has been managed skillfully
84. Neville v. Robinson, 1 Bailey's Law, 361 (1830); Miller v.
Anderson, 1 Hill's Equity 25 (1833); Riddle v. Riddle, 5 Richardson's
Equity 31 (1852); Renwick v. Smith, 11 S. C. 294 (1877); Roberts
v. Johns, 24 S. C. 580 (1885); Buerhaus v. DeSaussure, 41 S. C.
457, 20 S. E. 64 (1893); Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S. C. 377, 32 S. E.
(2d) 147 (1944).
85. 1 Hill's Equity 182 (1833).
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and faithfully; and satisfactory accounts kept and not
returned."6
Aside from the questionable applicability of the section
itself to trustees, the failure to comply with it-if the trustee
has otherwise properly performed his trusts-is of no ma-
terial significance and cannot visit upon the trustee any stat-
utory punishment or judicial censure on the part either of the
Probate Court or the court of equity.
V
Section 9048 of the Code provides:
"Trustees shall be allowed the same commissions for
the execution of their trusts as are allowed by law to
executors and administrators."
Have you in actual cases before you interpreted, or do
you now interpret, it, as giving power to the Probate Court
to allow or deny commissions claimed by testamentary trus-
tees ?
22 answered yes; there were no negatives. Of the 22, 8
stated that they had allowed commissions to trustees in actual
cases. This last statistic does not tally with Question IV (2),
since if, in 19 counties, trustees customarily file periodic ac-
counts, they are stating items of commissions in their account,
which must be approved or disapproved by the Probate Court.
This discrepancy must be due to oversight in failing to specify
between actual cases and mere interpretation.
Comment: The answer to this question depends upon the
necessity of filing returns, as discussed in the preceding ques-
tion. If such returns are necessary, the Probate Judge-un-
less he is a mere custodian of the report-must pass upon all
items, including those for commissions.
If the Probate Judge does have the power to allow or deny
86. The court is referring to the Act of 1745 (3 Stat. 666) which
provided that guardians and trustees of minors should render accounts
to the Secretary of State every three years. The Act further fixed the
Commissions of executors and administrators and provided that fail-
ure to file accounts should result in forfeiture of commissions; it
provided for commissions to trustees, but prescribed no forfeiture for
failure to file.
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commissions, he is, with testamentary trustees, confronted
with criteria which are considerably different from those ap-
plied to executors and administrators. His work is fairly well
charted for him with the personal representative, but no such
clear course of assessment is his with the trustee.
The statutes regulating the commissions of executors and
administrators-which, to an extent, control the commissions
of trustees-are Sections 9017, 9018, 9019, 9020, of the Code
of 1942. Section 9017 fixes the rate of compensation; Sec-
tion 9018 provides for additional compensation, and the mode
of obtaining it for extraordinary services; Section 9019 calls
for division of commissions according to services performed
where there are co-representatives; Section 9020 provides for
compensation to the estate of a deceased representative.
Prior to 1943, when Section 9017 was amended,s7 that sec-
tion allowed 2 per cent. on moneys received, and 2 per
cent. on moneys disbursed, with a virtual 10 per cent. on in-
come received on invested funds. Prior to the 1943 amend-
ment the statute read "two dollars and fifty cents for every
hundred dollars which he * * shall receive, and the sum of
two dollars and fifty cents for every hundred dollars which
he * * shall pay away." This language was construed in many
cases to permit commissions only on money, and not to allow
commissions on personal property, whether chattels or choses
in action, held in specie, nor unless it could be said that the
fiduciary had actually "received" funds for the estate ;S and
the same principle was applied to trustees.s But, in 1943,
the section was amended by the insertion of the words "ap-
praised value of all personal assets" after the words "hundred
dollars" in both places; so that the pertinent portion now
reads "two dollars and fifty cents for every hundred dollars
appraised value of all personal assets * * which he shall re-
ceive, and the sum of two dollars and fifty cents for every
87. 43 Stat. 35.
88. Rutledge v. Williamson, I DeSaussure 159 (1789); Ruff v. Sum-
mers, 4 DeSaussure 529 (1814); Ball v. Brown, Bailey's Equity 374
(1831) ; Jones v. Jones, 39 S. C. 247, 17 S. E. 587, (1892); Buerhaus
v. DeSaussure, note 84 supra; DeLoach v. Surratt, 58 S. C. 117, 36
S. E. 532 (1900); Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 60 S. C. 272, 38 S. E. 423
(1900); Herndon v. Caine, 106 S. C. 230, 91 S. E. 1 (1916); Spartan-
burg County v. Arthur, 180 S. C. 81, 185 S. E. 486 (1935), receiver.
89. College of Charleston v. Willingham, 13 Richardson's Equity
195 (1867); Lanier v. Brunson, 21 S. C. 41 (1883).
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hundred dollars appraised value of all personal assets * *
which he shall pay away."
It is easy to see that this change in the base for compu-
tation of commissions is vital and far-reaching. Thus, where,
before the amendment, an executor or administrator received
or collected $5,000 in money, and chattels and securities ap-
praised at $100,000 which he did not thereafter sell, he was
entitled to commissions only on $5,000, receiving and disburs-
ing. Since 1943-at least as to estates whose administration
originated following the enactment date (the effect on es-
tates created before that time but continuing thereafter is
open to question)-the representative would be entitled to
commissions on the total of money and property-$105,000-
although he may have acted, for all practical purposes, only
as a custodian of the property other than the cash.
The writer does not here concern himself with the fair-
ness or unfairness of this change in the law that so greatly
augments the compensation of the executor or administrator;
but there is cause for concern in the undoubted complication
that besets trust estates by the amendment. An appraisal of
all property, real and personal, is called for by statute as an
incident of the administration of all decedents' estates.w With
this appraisal there is at hand a base for computation of
commissions for an executor or administrator; but the ap-
praisal is on the decedent's estate and not on the trust estate,
and is for the purpose of fixing the representative's liability
and furnishing a tentative base for the calculation of inheri-
tance taxes. It is difficult to see how the trustee's commission
can be based on an appraisal made for a different purpose.
There is no provision for appraisal of the estate held by the
trustee, and an attempt to tax the trust estate, or measure
the trustee's liability, on the basis of an appraisal which the
law does not require of the trustee, may result in grave in-
justice to the trust estate. Furthermore, if, in a testamentary
trust, we accept the appraisal made through the executor,
how long is that appraisal to endure? Let us say that a
trustee received from the executor personal property ap-
praised as of the time of the death of the testator at $25,000.
At the time of the trustee's taking over of the property, it
is worth, by increase, $35,000, and at the time of the trustee's
90. Sees. 8987 et seq., Sec. 2488, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
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delivery thereof to the beneficiary-say, on reaching his 21st
birthday, ten years later-the property has increased in value
to $50,000. There has been only a single appraisal-that made
through the executor. Is this appraisal to remain constant
throughout? Or, is the trustee entitled to have an appraisal
made at any subsequent time-particularly at the date of the
delivery of the property to the beneficiary-to carry the up-
ward value? Will it work in reverse: as where the property
originally appraised at $25,000 is actually worth at the time of
delivery to the beneficiary, through depreciation, only $5,000?
Can the trustee claim the benefits of the original appraisal,
or must he be carried along on the fluctuating value of the
property?
A further complication is introduced by the amendment
as it may affect trustees: they are entitled to commissions
whether the trust is testamentary or inter vivos, since the
statute does not limit commissions to trusts created by wills.91
In fact, a large part of the corporate trustee's work is in the
field of living trusts. Of course, the trust instrument may fix
the compensation and the mode or base for determining it;92
but, in the absence of such provision, what, in an inter vivos
trust, is the so-called "appraised value" which is to be used?
Here we do not have even the fortuitous appraisal made
through the executor by which the testamentary trustee may
-perhaps-be guided. This obviously unperfected attempt
to increase fiduciaries' commissions, and the complicated
and unanswered questions it presents in trusts-these are
comment enough in themselves on a bad legislative job.
The standards for the allowance of commissions to the
91. Muckenfuss v. Heath, note 85 supra; College of Charleston v.
Willingham, note 89 supra; Lanier v. Brunson, note 89 supra; Cobb
v. Fant, 36 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. 959 (1891); Singleton v. Lowndes, 9 S. C.
465 (1877); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 81 S. C. 506, 62 S. E.
845 (1908); Sartor v. Newberry Land Co., 104 S. C. 184, 88 S. E.
467 (1915); Neeley v. Peoples Bank, 133 S. C. 43, 130 S. E. 550 (1925).
92. College of Charleston v. Willingham, note 89 supra; In re Norris'
Estate, 153 S. C. 203, 150 S. E. 693 (1929). The same is true where
there is no trust, in a will fixing the compensation of the executor:
Rothmahler v. Meyer, 4 DeSaussure 215, 6 Am. Dec. 613 (1812);
McCaw v. Blewitt, 2 McCord's Equity 90 (1827); Esswein v. Seigling,
2 Hill's Equity 600, Riley's Equity 200 (1827); Finklea v. Jordon, 14
Richardson's Equity 160 (1868); In re Norris' Estate, supra.
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executor or administrator, on the one hand, and to the testa-
mentary trustee, on the other, are sufficiently different in
each case to present the Probate Court with a serious set of
problems, and to bring to the front the question again of
whether he has the power, at all, to pass on dlaims for com-
missions. The Probate Judge is quite precisely hedged in
with respect to his allowance of commissions to executors
and administrators. Their conduct in the management of
the estate-whether it has resulted in a loss to the estate or
not-is no test of their right to commissions. They are en-
titled, willy nilly, to commissions, except when the reasons
for forfeiture prescribed by statute are present. That for-
feiture occurs only when the representative neglects to ren-
der an annual account within the time prescribed;93 and,
unless he can show good cause to the Probate Court for his
delay or failure, he forfeits his commissions, according to the
cases, only for the years in which he has failed to make such
accounting.94 Thus, if an executor or administrator season-
ably filed a return for his first year, he would be entitled,
come what might, to commissions on everything which he had
received-embracing the personal corpus of the estate, and
what he had collected and what he had paid out; but in the
succeeding years, the failure to file accounts would not af-
fect his right to the commission earned the first year, which
would be a minimum of 2 per cent. on the corpus which
he had received, plus the same percentage on what he had
paid out during that year. And, even where he has failed
to make returns in a given year and thus forfeited his com-
missions for that year, he is still allowed commissions on
the balance remaining in his hands which he is compelled to,
93. Sec. 9012, S. C. Code of Laws 1942, as amended by Acts 1943
(43 Stat.) 182.
94. The cases on this point are too numerous for citation. Some
of the more recent ones are Blackmon v. Blackmon, 113 S. C. 478,
101 S. E. 827 (1919); In re Norris' Estate, note 91 supra; Hutchison
v. Daniel, 170 S. C. 459, 171 S. E. 13 (1932); Brannan v. Woodward,
175 S. C. 1, 178 S. E. 249 (1934); Beacham v. Ross, note 15 supra;
Beacham v. Ross, 190 S. C. 219, 2 S. E. (2d) 690 (1939); Lazenby
v. Mackey, 196 S. C. 507, 14 S. E. (2d) 12 (1941). In Black v. Blakely,
note 67 supra, the court denied commissions where the returns filed
were "irregular, imperfect, and unintelligible", calling them, "altogether
illusory".
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and does, pay over to those entitled. 6
From the foregoing, it will be seen that seldom, if ever,
can an executor or an administrator be deprived altogether
of his commissions; although, of course, he may actually re-
ceive, or be entitled to, nothing if the losses caused by his
breaches of trust exceed the commissions to which he is en-
titled. But, with a trustee, the conditions for forfeiture are
different. There is no statute-as has already been pointed
out-that specifies the deprivation of commissions for any
act; and it has already been shown that the failure to file
a return under a statute which called for it, but which did
not carry a forfeiture provision, would not entail a loss of
compensation.96 The guiding principle for the compensation
of the trustee is the proper management by him of the
estate; his maladministration may cause him to lose all his
commissions.9 7 Thus, the court of equity may deny him, for
cause, the right to receive any commissions; and while he
may be in a more favorable position than an executor and
administrator if he does not file a return, he is decidedly in
a less advantageous position on the whole.
It is difficult to see how a Probate Judge, in the ordinary
course of receiving returns in which commissions are claimed
by a testamentary trustee, can properly evaluate the propriety
of those claims. Whether commissions should be allowed
would depend on an over-all survey of the administration
of the trust estate; and how the matter can be determined
on the basis of annual returns is hard to understand. Yet, if
and as the Probate Judge receives a return, with claimed
items of commissions, he must-if the return is regular on
its face-allow commissions. Once having allowed them,
could he, on application for a discharge (see Question VI
post), disallow them?
There are-surprisingly or not surprisingly, depending
95. Gee v. Hicks, Richardson's Equity Cases 5 (1831); Davidson v.
Moore, 14 S. C. 251 (1880); Epperson v. Jackson, note 17 supra;
Sherwood v. McLaurin, 103 S. C. 330, 88 S. E. 363 (1915); Blackmon v.
Blackmon, note 94 supra; Hutchison v. Daniel, note 94 supra; Bran-
nan v. Woodward, note 94 supra.
96. Muckenfuss v. Heath, note 85 supra, and text.
97. Muckenfuss v. Heath, note 85 supra; Singleton v. Lowndes, note
91 supra; Cobb v. Fant, note 91 supra. In Neeley v. Peoples Bank, note
91 supra, the court refused commissions only for those years in which
breaches of trust took place.
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on the point of view-no cases reported in which the allow-
ance or disallowance by the Probate Judge of commissions
to a testamentary trustee has been put in issue. One case,
however, touches barely upon it. In In re Norris' Estate,93 a
Probate Judge's adjudication on commissions of an executor-
trustee was passed on, the issue being whether the fiduciary
whose commissions in both capacities were fixed by the will
was entitled to two sets of commissions. It was properly held
that the terms of the will should control, and only one set
of commissions was allowed-the calculation being made on
the fiduciary's services as executor.
The point to this extended discussion of the different
criteria for commissions of personal representatives and those
of the trustee is that the Probate Judge cannot use the same
yardstick for both situations, and that in testamentary trusts
he would be exercising a function that the machinery of
his court is ill adapted to.
VI
Seection 213 of the Code provides as follows:
"It shall not be lawful for any judge of probate in
this State to grant a final discharge to any executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian, or committee, unless
such executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or com-
mittee shall have finally accounted for the estate in his
hands, and have given notice in a newspaper of the county
(if there be no newspaper in the county, then in some
newspaper having the greatest circulation therein) for
the space of at least one month, that on a day certain
application will be made to the said judge of probate
for final discharge. No such discharge shall affect any
distributee, legatee, cestui que trust, ward or lunatic,
who has not been made a party to such application,
either by personal service of the notice, or by publication
in the mode provided for absent defendants."
(1) Have you in actual cases before you construed this
Section, or do you now interpret it, as makiing it necessary
that every testamentary trustee apply to the Probate Court
for a discharge in order to be relieved of liability to the
trust beneficiaries?
98. Note 92 supra.
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21 answered yes; 1 answered no. 2 of those answering
yes stated that the trustee must apply to the Probate Court
to be relieved of the liability to the beneficiaries; 1 stated
that, only if the trustee had been appointed by the Probate
Court must he make application to that court for his dis-
charge.
Comment: The statute from which the section in question
is taken was enacted in 1869,99 and is practically verbatim
with the section except for the proviso as to the making of
parties to the proceeding those affected by it. This last pro-
viso seems to have been inserted by the Revised Statutes of
1893.100 The discharge statute was not the origin of the
practice of obtaining discharges by fiduciaries answerable
to the Probate Court, but was designed solely to regulate the
granting of discharges by an additional requirement of news-
paper notice. This was decided in Roberts v. Johns,ll which
held that publication of notice was a condition precedent,
but that it did not dispense with the long standing require-'
ment of making interested persons parties. The proviso now
in the section was, no doubt, inserted to make this admoni-
tion effective; and the cases hold that a discharge granted
without the service ,of a notice of application for discharge
-in addition to newspaper notice-is not binding.102,
The effect of a discharge properly granted is stated in
McNair v. Howle :103
" 'Executors or administrators who have been duly dis-
charged can no longer exercise the functions of their of-
fice, nor can they be required to make further accounting
in the absence of fraud or error in the entry of the de-
cree discharging them.' * * *
"If the order of discharge abrogates the powers and
discharges the liabilities of the administrator, it is equiv-
99. 14 Stat. 263.
100. Rev. Stat. 1893, Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 41.
101. 16 S. C. 171 (1881).
102. McNair v. Howle, note 14 supra; Beatty v. National Surety Co.,
note 7 supra; Chamberlain v. Nat. Bank, 202 S. C. 115, 24 S. E. (2d)
158 (1943); First Nat. Bank v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 207 S. C. 17, 35
S. E. (2d) 47 (1945).
103. Note 14 supra. See, also, Ward v. Parker, 19 S. C. 603 (1883);
Quick v. Campbell, 44 S. C. 386, 22 S. E. 479 (1895); Brock v.
Kirkpatrick, 72 S. C. 491, 52 S. E. 592 (1905).
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alent to a judgment vacating the office of administrator.
* * * When an administrator has full and faithfully ad-
ministered the estate in his hands * * * and, after due
service of personal notice of those entitled thereto, has
obtained an order of discharge from the Probate Court,
such decree should protect him from further liability
again to take up the burden of the trust by reason of
after-discovered claims or assets."
It was held in this case, however, that such an order of
discharge "does not entail extending to it the force of a final
adjudication that the estate has been fully administered", and
that, accordingly, although the general administrator had
previously been discharged, the estate might be reopened for
de bonis non administration to deal with claims not previously
presented.104
The proceeding for the obtaining of a. final discharge is,
in reality, a proceeding for a final accounting, the moving
party being the fiduciary rather than the beneficiary. When
a trustee's accountings are approved in a court of equity, in
a suit instituted either by the beneficiary or by the trustee,
the effect of the approval is to work a discharge. Of course,
prior to the enactment of the statute in 1869, accountings
between a testamentary trustee and the beneficiary in the
Court of Ordinary would not take place. The introduction of
the trustee into the discharge statute alongside those fidu-
ciaries customarily amenable to the Probate Court is, ob-
viously, an innovation. Under the Constitution of 1868, the
Probate Court does not entertain such jurisdiction, because
of its restriction to "matters testamentary". 105
104. The chances of an estate's being reopened through do bonis ?on
administration to take care of claims not previously submitted have
been considerably lessened by the transformation of the statute deal-
ing with presentation of claims into a non-claim statute, requiring the
filling of claims by creditors-with certain exceptions-within eleven
months of the publication of the first notice to creditors; failure to file
resulting in a barring of the claim. Section 8993, S. C. Code of Laws
1942, as amended by Acts 1943 (43 Stat.) 260.. Further as to the possibility of reopening an estate after discharge
of the administrator, see Lucas v. Southern Ry. Co., 156 S. C. 529, 153
S. E. 638 (1930).
105. See Poole v. Brown, note 10 supra, and discussion of this case
under Question I.
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If, since the Constitution of 1895, the legislature has
authority to confer jurisdiction over trusts to the Probate
Court, the question of the mechanics of the granting of the
discharge to a testamentary trustee comes to the front. Does,
or can, a Probate Judge grant "letters dismissory", as he
does with the other fiduciaries in his charge? Such letters
practically presuppose the prior grant of letters; and, as has
been seen, there are no letters issued to a trustee. Does a
Probate Judge, after granting a discharge to a trustee, have
the power to reopen the trust estate and reinstate admin-
istration? If a beneficiary or a creditor of the trust estate
objects to the granting of a discharge, what procedure must
the Probate Judge employ to ascertain whether the trustee
has properly administered? And-so far as the Probate Court
is concerned-what is the status of creditors of the trust
estate-not those of the deceased settlor whose debts are
handled in the principal administration, but those contracted
by the trustee for the benefit of the trust estate? The remedies
of such creditors against the trust estate are made available
only in equity, through subrogation to the trustee's right of
indemnity or exoneration. 06 Can the Probate Court pass upon
these matters, which are of equitable cognizance?
Even if the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to release
the trustee from his office may be subjected to a constitutional
attack, yet, if the cestui que trust, being competent, has been
properly served, and defaults, or if he appears and does not
object to the jurisdiction, he may thereafter be precluded
from assailing the court's action on jurisdictional grounds.
A case, however, is yet to be reported in which the issue of
that court's jurisdiction appears. As a matter of fact, there
are no reported cases, since 1895, in which any question of
a Probate Court's action either on intermediate accounts or
on the final account and discharge has been presented. This
is indicative either of a remarkably uniform degree of regu-
larity in trustees' accountings in that Court (and, necessarily
106. Magwood v. Patterson, 1 Hill's Equity 228 (1833); Guerry v.
Capers, Bailey's Equity 159 (1830); McKelvey v. Tate, 3 Richardson's
Law 339 (1832); Welsh v. Davis, 3 S. C. 110, 16 Am. Rep. 690 (1871);
Neal v. Bleckly, 51 S. C. 506, 29 S. E. 249 (1897). Actually, in such
cases, the creditors are not creditors of the trust estate but are
creditors of the trustee, and their rights are, as indicated in the text,
fundamentally derivative.
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of the trustees' integrity), or of a genuine dearth of such
accounting there at all. Actually, if a trustee faithfully per-
forms, the trust will terminate without the grant of a dis-
charge;107 and the trustee needs no discharge, from a Pro-
bate Court or any other court, to relieve him of liability;
even though it may be admitted that, clothed with an order
of discharge properly granted, he may quite safely rely upon
it as a shield to action thereafter by the beneficiary.
(2) If application for discharge is made to your Court for
-discharge by a testamentary trustee, do you require the same
prior and final accountings as are required of executors and
administrators?
22 answered yes; there were no negatives. 1 stated that
he accepts a final return or accounting made in the Court of
Common Pleas as a sufficient account.
Comment: The course adopted by the Probate Judges is
prudent and logical, and it would be strange if they followed
a different one. But the question may well be asked: if a
trustee has filed no return, intermediate or final, and seeks a
discharge, having given the required newspaper notice and
having properly served the parties in interest, and no ap-
pearance is made in opposition to the application, can the
Probate Judge lawfully withhold the discharge?
VII
(1) Have you ever authorized a testamentary trustee to
sell, mortgage, or pledge real or personal property belong-
ing to the trust estate?
6 answered yes; 16 answered no.
While only a yes or no answer was called for, in a few
cases comments were added which are interesting. One judge
who answered no said he believed, "It might be done in case
of a minor's ownership of farm land on the agricultural loan
Act for minor's benefit." Another: "The practice in the Pro-
bate Court for County is that real estate is
sold under a marshalling of the estate in aid of assets to pay
107. Cf. Leaphart v. National Surety Corp., 167 S. C. "327, 166 S. E.
415 (1932).
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indebtedness. However, I believe that under proper petition
and appraisal under oath of three or four disinterested wit-
nesses that all property held in trust could be sold unless
prohibited by will." Another states simply: "Have authorized
him to sell property."
(2) If you have, what do you regard as your authority
for such permission?
Sources of authority cited: by 1, Sections 208 and 209
of the Code; by 2, Section 208. Other answers: "I have ad-
vised litigants to proceed in the Probate Court and to also
at the same time bring an identical action in the Court of
Common Pleas, thus closing the door for exception as to juris-
diction." "Authority vested in me as a Probate Judge. I feel
that my office, considering its scope in its entirety, gives me
authority." "When it is properly shown to the Probate Court
that the best interest of the trust will be served." "Have orig-
inal jurisdiction over trusts."
(3) If you have not, do you now think that you have such
authority?
2 answered yes unqualifiedly; 7 answered no; 2 made no
comment. 5 gave qualified affirmative answers, as follows:
1 said "only if given by will"; 1 said "if trust instrument
authorizes it"; 2 said they would allow a sale "in aid of as-
sets"; 1 said he would permit mortgage under Sections 8660
et seq. of the Code. 08
Comment: The question of selling, mortgaging and pledg-
ing is, of course, limited to cases where the trust instrument
does not authorize the particular act. If it did, the consent of
no court would be necessary, unless, improbably, the instru-
ment provided that the trustee should sell, mortgage or pledge
only upon the prior assent of the Probate, or some other,
Court.
The evident coupling of the trustee with the executor and
108. These sections authorize the guardians of infants and persons
non compotes mentis to borrow money for their wards and mortgage
their property as security. The Court of Common Pleas is given juris-
diction by these statutes. No reference is made to the Probate Court nor
is there any mention of trustees.
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administrator in some of the answers of the Probate Judges
makes it desirable to compare the powers of these fiduciaries,
and to compare the authority of the court of equity with that
of the Probate Court in respect to the acts under discussion.
It has already been pointed out that an administrator
has no title to the land of his intestate, and that the land
passes immediately on death of the owner to his heirs at law.
Accordingly, the administrator cannot sell the land or enter
into contracts in reference to it. 09 Since the land is subject
to debts, he may-and, in fact, it is his duty to-bring an
action to subject it to sale when there is an insufficiency of
personal property. For these purposes, and these purposes
alone, the Probate Court may, in a properly brought action,
direct the sale of the intestate's real estate."0 The authority
of the Court of Common Pleas, as a court of equity, is un-
deniable.
It follows, inescapably, from the administrator's lack of
title to real estate, that he cannot mortgage it; but he can
seek the aid of the court of equity and obtain its consent to
a mortgaging of the interests of the heirs at law in a neces-
sary case, the heirs being made parties.m The Probate Court
has no such power, since that power is distinctly equitable."-
Like the administrator, the executor takes no title to real
estate, which passes on the testator's death to his devisees;
and any sale or contract that he should make of, or concern-
109. Allan v. Bruton, 1 McMullan's Law 249 (1841); Perry v. Brown,
I Bailey's Law 45; Bank v. Inglesby, Speers' Equity 399 (1844); Wiley
v. Johnsey, 6 Richardson's Law 355 (1853); Thompson v. Hudgens,
161 S. C. 450, 159 S. E. 807 (1931). There are numerous cases, not
necessary to be cited here, in which, on this principle, a surety for
an administrator has been held not liable for rents collected by the
administrator.
110. The cases on this point are plentiful. The power to direct a sale
in aid of assets, as an incident to the supervision of administration
of estates, was firmly established in McNamee v. Waterbury, 4 S. C. 156
(1872). The practice is regulated by statute: Secs. 9001-9011, S. C.
Code of Laws 1942.
111. Spencer v. Godfrey, note 24 supra; Spencer v. Gibbes, note 24
supra.
112. Mack v. Stanley, note 23 supra. This case involves an executor,
but the principle is the same in both cases.
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ing, it would be ineffectual."3 The testator may, however, de-
vise the land directly to the executor for the purposes of sale,
or he may merely give the power to sell; and, in both these
cases, obviously, a sale could properly be made. The mere
authority itself, though, does not give the executor the title
-although that is what the purchaser from him will get;
and the executor, on that account, has nothing else to do with
the land and cannot maintain action against third parties for
trespass upon, or injury, to the property" 4 Where the will
neither gives the executor title for purposes of sale, nor gives
the power to sell, the executor is powerless to sell even for
the purpose of paying debts; but since, as in intestacy, the
land is subject to the decedent's obligations, the executor may,
and should, effect a sale through court action, when there is
a deficiency of personal assets. The power of the Probate
Court to direct a sale in aid of assets is the same power
which he exercises at the behest of the administrator."5 The
equitable powers of the Court of Common Pleas are, of course,
ample warrant for the authority to sell, in order to pay debts.
Since the executor has no title and cannot sell, the corol-
lary is that he cannot mortgage real estate, unless the will
authorizes it. The power to sell which may be given to an
executor by will does not embrace the power to mortgage.- 6
The executor may obtain the consent of a court of equity to
113. Crosland v. Murdock, 4 McCord's Law 217 (1827); Finley v.
Burgoyne, Dudley's Equity 133 (1838); Kinsler v. Holmes, 2 S. C.
483 (871); Hunter v. Hunter, 58 S. C. 382, 38 S. E. 734 (1900).
The lack of inherent power to sell real estate is implicit in the many
cases in which the court has had to determine, in construing wills,
whether the executor had been given a power to sell by implication.
For a typical case, see Allworden v. Lemon, 183 S. C. 421, 191 S. E.
215 (1937).
114. Haskell v. House, 1 Treadway 106, 3 Brevard 242 (1812); King
v. Ferguson, 2 Nott & McCord 588 (1820); Ware v. Murph, Rice's Law
54, 33 Am. Dec. 97 (1838); Thomson v. Gaillard, 3 Richardson's Law
418, 45 Am. Dec. 778 (1846); Baldwin v. Cooley, 1 S. C. 256 (1869);
Reeves v. Brayton, 36 S. C. 384, 15 S. E. 658 (1891). But see Barbot
v. Thompson, 94 S. C. 3, 77 S. E. 716 (1912).
115. Shaw v. Barksdale, 25 S. C. 204 (1886). The practice for sale
of testate property in the Probate Court, in aid of assets, is the same
as for an intestate estate. Secs. 9001-9011, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
116. Graham v. Jones, 24 S. C. 241 (1885); Allen v. Ruddell, 51 S. C.
266, 29 S. E. 198 (1897) ; 92 A.L.R. 882. But see McDavid v. McDavid,
note 24 supra.
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a mortgage of real estate; n 7 actually, what is mortgaged in
such a proceeding is the acquired interests of the devisee.
But the Probate Court has no power to authorize an executor
to mortgage land."
8
Coming now to the status of the representative, as to
personal property: the law is familiar that he takes title to
that kind of property. At common law, the administrator
and the executor had virtually absolute dominion over the
personal property of the decedent, and neither of them needed
a court order or testamentary authorization to sell, mort-
gage, or pledge. One case puts it this way: "At the common
law, the assets of the deceased person, in the absence of fraud,
might be disposed of absolutely by his executor or admin-
istrator and could not be followed by creditors, legatees, or
next of kin, into the hands of the alienee." 19 That common
law right, however, was long ago restricted by statutes, and
neither an administrator nor an executor (unless he is given
power to sell by the will) can dispose of personal property
of the estate without prior authorization by the Probate
Court.m The purpose of these statutes is not so much to con-
fer authority upon the Probate Court as to place a curb upon
the representive's hitherto unlimited power. The statutes have
been held to apply to "personal chattels or visible effects",
and not to apply to choses in action: as to the latter the com-
mon law power of the representative to dispose of them seems
to be unchanged.m
Since, at common law, the dominion of the personal rep-
resentative over personal property was complete, it would
follow that he could properly exercise the lesser power of
mortgage or pledge; and one case plainly states that there
might be "a valid alienation by way either of sale or pledge"
117. McDavid v. McDavid, note 24 supra, general principle. The cases
cited under note 111 supra are comprehensive enough to embrace the
executor.
118. Mack v. Stanley, note 23 supra.
119. Rhame v. Lewis, 13 Richardson's Equity 269 (1867). To the
same effect: Magwood ads. Legge, Harper's Law 116 (1824); Sea-
brook ads. Williams, 3 McCord's Law 371 (1825).
120. Secs. 9059, as amended by Acts 1947 (45 Stat.) 44; 9060; 9061,
S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
121. Rhame v. Lewis, note 119 supra; Reynolds v. Rees, 23 S. C. 438
(1885); Chapman v. City Council, note 39 supra.
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(italics supplied).122 Carrying out this premise, the court, in
that case, having declared that the representative's power
over choses in action remained as at common law, held that
a pledge of choses in action was permissible without the ne-
cessity of consent of Probate Court. If the power to sell chat-
tels (as distinguished from choses in action) has been re-
stricted by statute, it would seem, logically, that the power
to mortgage or pledge them has likewise been curtailed; since
the ultimate effect of a security transaction may be an in-
voluntary alienation through loss of the property at a forced
sale. Whether the Probate Court, having the power to author-
ize a sale of chattels, might authorize a mortgage or pledge
of them, has not, so far as this writer has been able to find,
been passed upon-although the case last discussed, through
inferences, may be seeming authority for such action.
Comparing the trustee to the executor and the adminis-
trator, we find that the trustee has title to the trust prop-
erty, real and personal. But, unlike the personal representa-
tive in one respect and like him in another, he has no inher-
ent power of sale as to any species of property which he
holds in trust. It is elemental law that, unless the trust in-
strument, specifically or by necessary implication, confers a
power of sale, the trustee cannot properly sell.m The power
of a court of equity to authorize a sale, in order to subserve
the interests of trust beneficiaries, is clear and has been util-
ized in many cases.124 So extensive is this power that, in fur-
therance of the dominant objects of the trust, the court may
authorize the trustee to dispose of property even where the
instrument forbids the sale."5
122. Rhame v. Lewis, note 119 supra. See 21 Am. Jur. 510, stating
common law rule in accord.
123. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 190; Thomson v. Peake, 38 S. C.
440, 17 S. E. 45 (1892); Calvary Baptist Church v. Dart, 68 S. C. 221,
48 S. E. 66 (1903); Prince v. Matthews, 159 S. C. 526, 157 S. E. 836
(1930); Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S. C. 287, 26 S. E. (2d) 821 (1943).
124. Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 167, 190; Boggs v. Reid, note 71
supra; Farr v. Gilreath, 23 S. C. 502 (1885); Mauldin v. Mauldin,
101 S. C. 1, 85 S. E. 60 (1915); Patton v. First Presbyterian Church,
129 S. C. 15, 123 S. E. 493 (1924) ; Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134
S. E. 859 (1926); S. C. Nat'l Bank v. Bates, 175 S. C. 169, 178 S. E.
611 (1934).
125. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 167, comm. a; 77 A. L. R. 971;
Hendley v. Payne, 200 S. C. 31, 20 S. E. (2d) 401 (1942); Wingard
v. Hennessee, note 67 supra.
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Paralleling the inability of the trustee to sell is the in-
capacity to mortgage or pledge, unless the trust instrument,
specifically or by implication, confers it.n6 Nor does a power
of sale in the trust instrument embrace the power to mort-
gage, 7 a principle already noted in the power of sale given
by will to the executors. But a court of equity may, undoubt-
edly, authorize a mortgage m
The crux of these comparisons between the power of the
personal representative and those of the trustee, and between
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court over the personal rep-
resentative and the jurisdiction of the court of equity over
the trustee, is that, just as the inherent powers of the fiduciar-
ies differ, so does the authority of the respective courts hav-
ing control of them; and the Probate Court, if it does have
jurisdiction over testamentary trustees, is to be guided, not
by the law of executors and administrators, but by the law
of trusts.
If the Probate Court is to have the power to authorize
a trustee to sell, mortgage, and pledge, it can only be by
virtue of a general transfer of equity powers to that court
by the provisions of Section 209. No statute specifically grants
the authority to act in any of these matters. To speak, as
two of the Probate Judges did, of selling trust property "in
aid of assets", is to employ a language foreign to trusts but
native to the administration of decedents' estates. To refer
to Section 208 as the source of authority is to give to the
term "matters testamentary" a meaning that has already been
judicially discountenanced. If we attribute to Section 209 the
126. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 191; Matthews v. Heyward, 2 S. C.
239 (1870); Bomar v. Gist, 25 S. C. 340 (1886); Chapman v. Williams,
112 S. C. 402, 100 S. E. 360 (1919). But where the mortgage given by
a trustee is a part of the transaction creating the trust, such a
mortgage is valid. Barrett v. Cochran, 8 S. C. 48 (1875); Elliott v.
Mackereoll, 19 S. C. 238 (1882); Cohen v. Goldberg, 144 S. C. 70, 142
S. E. 36 (1927).
127. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 191, comm. b; Sheffield v. Gregg,
105 S. C. 219, 89 S. E. 664 (1916); Pickett v. Geer, 156 S. C. 346,
153 S. E. 349 (1930); 92 A. L. R. 882. And, it seems, the power to
mortgage conferred by the trust instrument does not include the power
to give a negotiable promissory note. Ballou v. Young, 42 S. C. 170,
20 S. E. 84 (1894).
128. Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 167, 191; Fraser v. Fishburne, 4
S. C. 314 (1873); Chapman v. Williams, note 126 supra; McDavid v.
McDavid, note 24 supra. /
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grant of plenary power, then there is the striking paradox
that the Probate Judge will be able to deal more extensively
with trustees than he can with executors and administrators.
If this were so, for example, he could authorize a trustee to
mortgage real property, but he could not authorize an execu-
tor or administrator to do so. And, while he could not en-
tertain an action by an executor or administrator to sell land
except in aid of assets upon a deficiency of personal prop-
erty, he would be able to authorize a trustee to sell land for
any purpose serving the paramount interests of the bene-
ficiaries. As the writer does not subscribe to the belief that
Section 209 is a plenary grant, he does not see in the Probate
Court the power to authorize a trustee to sell, mortgage, or
pledge.
There are no reported cases, to the writer's knowledge,
touching on the jurisdiction of the Probate Court in these
respects. In one case, however, the question arose as to neces-
sary parties in a proceeding to sell, brought in the Probate
Court. In State ex rel. Daniel v. Strong,m trustees of a char-
itable testamentary trust sought and obtained the approval
of the Probate Court to sell shares of stock. The will author-
ized the trustees to sell; and why the trustees sought the
approval of the Probate Court in the first place is difficult
to comprehend, unless the trustees felt that they needed
judicial forearming. The application was ex parte; and the
proceeding was held defective on this score-although the
sale itself was sanctioned as being proper under the terms
of the will. The conclusion of the Master, to whom the case
had been referred, was accepted by the Supreme Court. The
Master stated:
"I cannot regard an order on an ex parte proceeding
in the Probate Court as final and binding on the bene-
ficiaries of a trust, particularly if they are minors, un-
less they are brought before the Court. To preclude any
inquiry into the bona fides of a transaction the parties
must all have been before the Court in the original
hearing."
Inasmuch as the question of jurisdiction was not raised,
this case should not be taken as even a silent approval of the
129. 185 S. C. 27, 192 S. E. 641 (1937).
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Probate Court's jurisdiction, and it must be confined to the
matter of parties. A collateral question might, even so, be
asked: who are the beneficiaries to be brought before the
court where the trust is a charity? But that is another
subject, and one should not, hastily, answer-the Attorney
General.
VIII
(1) Have you ever issued an order or decree permitting
a testamentary trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust,
as in the case of an emergency?
22 answered no; there were no affirmatives.
Comment: It is to be admitted that this question could
have been better worded. The last phrase "as in the case of
emergency" is misleading as perhaps indicating that devia-
tion can properly be authorized only in an emergency. The
phrase was intended only to be illustrative. Question VII-
authority to sell, mortgage, pledge-actually involves devia-
tion, since, if the trust instrument does not specifically or
impliedly authorize the doing of any of those acts, the court's
sanction to their being done is a permission to the trustee
to deviate. Hence, while all 22 answered no to this question,
6 of the judges have actually committed deviations in author-
izing the trustee to sell, mortgage or pledge. See Question
VI (1).
(2) If you have, what do you regard as your authority
to take such action?
Since none answered yes to (1), there were no answers
to this question, except a couple obviously intended to be un-
der sub-question (3).
(3) If you have not, do you now think that you have such
authority?
5 answered yes; 10 answered no; 3 were "doubtful"; 1
said that he construed his authority from the instrument (?) ;
3 made no comment.
Comment: There is hardly any room for a Probate Judge
to allow the executor to deviate from the terms of the will.
64
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss1/6
REVIEW SECTION
Clearly, in some cases, the court of equity may permit him
to do so, to preserve the estate.130
In its broad native jurisdiction over trusts the court of
equity, undeniably, has the power to permit deviation by a
trustee where necessary to give effect to the paramount pur-
pose of the settlor.131 And the power extends to sanctioning
a deviation previously committed by the trustee, where the
circumstances are such that, if application had been made
to the court in the first instance for permission thus to de-
part from the terms of the trust, the court would have ap-
proved.13 Any departure from the specific terms of the trust,
or any turning away from the duties or powers imposed or
given by law, comes within this extensive authority of the
court to sanction before the act is done or to approve after
it is done-the authority, of course, being exercised for the
furtherance or preservation of the trust and not for its de-
struction.
A typical instance of the power to permit, or subsequently
to approve, deviation, is to be found in the field of invest-
ments by a fiduciary. Circumstances may make it necessary
to invest in a way not prescribed by the terms of the trust,
130. Harris v. Harris, 86 S. C. 409, 68 S. E. 328 (1910).
131. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 167; Wannamaker v. S. C. State
Bank, 176 S. C. 133, 179 S. E. 896 (1935); Weston v. Weston, 210
S. C. 1, 41 S. E. (2d) 372 (1947). The point has already been
demonstrated in those cases permitting sales and mortgages.
132. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 167 (2), (3); Boggs v. Reid,
note 71 supra; Bacot v. Heyward, 5 S. C. 441 (1874); Pool v. Dial,
10 S. C. 440 (1878); Neeley v. Peoples Bank, note 91 supra; Pickett
v. Geer, note 127 supra; Epworth Orphanage v. Long, 207 S. C. 384,
36 S. E. (2d) 37 (1946). The principle is applied to other beneficiaries.
See Hammasopoulo v. Hammasopoulo, 134 S. C. 54, 131 S. E. 319
(1925), and other cases cited there. See, also, Ryan v Bull, 3 Strobhart's
Equity 86 (1849), where the rule is stated: "What the court, on ap-
plication, would have ordered to be done, it will sanction when done
by the parties voluntarily." The so-called "first instance" rule must,
however, be accepted with some reserve, and should be applied only
when there has been no unfavorable change of circumstances between
the time of deviation from the trust and the application for its con-
firmation by the court. See Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 167 (2), (3),
and comm. e.
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and where necessary, the court will initially permit, or sub-
sequently approve, it.133
No cases dealing with the jurisdictional aspects of the
Probate Court's consent to deviation appears in the reports,
but in Hood v. Cannon,"4 the Supreme Court had before it
the prolriety of a Probate Court's approval of an exchange
of bank stock, forming the corpus of the trust, for other
stock of a bank formed by merger and consolidation with
the bank whose stock was thus held. The Supreme Court
struck down the Probate Judge's order of sale, on the ground
that the proceedings were ex p trte, and that the beneficiaries,
not being parties, were not bound. Since no jurisdictional
issue was raised, this case can hardly be regarded as even a
tacit admission that the Probate Court had jurisdiction for
the purposes sought.
A related problem of deviation is that of the trustee's
power to effect a compromise of claims against third per-
sons, and the consequential question of the Probate Court's
authority in respect to it. Executors and administrators have
inherent power, by virtue of their full title to choses in ac-
tion, to compromise claims,"3 but any compromise must, of
course, be honestly and reasonably made. There is a statute"30
which provides, in part, "all administrators and executors
may, by and with the consent of the Probate Judge, compro-
mise all demands coming into their hands as such, when the
same are appraised doubtful or worthless." The statute has
been construed to be permissive only, leaving unimpaired the
common law right of the representative, and it is not to be
treated as requiring the prior consent of the Probate Court
as a condition precedent.137
On the other hand, trustees do not have inherent power
to compromise claims but a compromise honestly and pru-
dently made without the prior approval of a court of equity
133. Patton v. First Presbyterian Church, note 124 supra; Kirton v.
Howard, note 124 supra; Wannamaker v. S. C. State Bank, note 131
supra.
134. 178 S. C. 94, 182 S. E. 306 (1935).
135. Verdier v. Simons, 2 McCord's Equity 385 (1827); Smith v.
Prothro, 2 S. C. 371 (1870); Roberts v. Johns, note 84 supra; 85
A. L. R. 176.,
136. Sec. 8999, S. C. Code of Laws 1942.
137. Geigers v. Kaigler, 9 S. C. 401 (1877).
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will be sustained on the "first instance" principle. 3
No case has been reported in which the authority of the
Probate Court to direct a compromise by a trustee has been
put in issue. But, in Epworth Orphanage v. Long,39 a testa-
mentary trustee sought and obtained, on ex parte applica-
tion, Probate Court authorization for the acceptance of cer-
tificates in the reorganization of an insolvent bank in which
the trust funds were deposited, the certificates calling for
repayment of a percentage representing a considerable dim-
inution in the amount of the deposit debt. The certificates
were, in effect, to be exchanged for the deposit. The Supreme
Court refused to uphold this Probate Court's authorization,
but on the ground that the beneficiaries were not made parties,
basing its opinion on Hood v. Cannon.140 Again, as in the
Hood case, the jurisdictional question was not raised, and
the instant case cannot seriously be looked upon as inferring
that no jurisdictional difficulty can arise in this type of pro-
ceeding. The answer to the question put here must, as in the
previous ones, depend upon the interpretation of Section 209.
Without finding there a plenary grant, the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court in the matters under discussion is manifestly
subject to doubt, if not actually to be denied.
Ix
(1) Have you ever issued an order or decree, at the in-
stance of a testamentary trustee and/or the beneficiaries,
directing the termination of the trust?
22 answered no; there were no affirmatives.
(2) If you have, what do you regard as your authority
for taking such action?
Since there were no affirmative ans wers, there were no
responses to this question.
138. Bacot v. Heyward, note 132 supra; Pool v. Dial, note 132 supra;
Epworth Orphanage v. Long, note 132 supra. Cf. Restatement of Trusts,
Sec. 192, which states that the trustee has the power. Actually, the
test of the propriety of the compromise is, not so much whether the
trustee does or does not have the power to begin with, but whether
the compromise as made is intrinsically reasonable.
139. Note 132 supra.
140. Note 134 supra.
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(3) If you have not, do you now think that you have such
authority ?
4 answered yes; 11 answered no; 2 were "doubtful"; 1
said he "construed authority from the instrument" (?) ; 4
did not answer.
Comment: The "termination" referred to in this question
is not the termination of a trust by its own terms, as where
the period for the duration of the trust has expired and all
the acts called for have been done'44 ; nor does it involve those
cases in which there is a merger, as where the trustee ac-
quires the beneficial interest or the beneficiary acquires the
trustee's title.42 In these cases no court decree is necessary
to bring about the termination of the trust: either the trust
is self-terminated, or the parties in interest bring it about.
The termination that is involved here is the putting an end
to the trust by the court-and not a mere judicial declara-
tion that it has come to an end.
The termination of a trust by the court of equity does
not mean a destruction of the trust, annihilating the inter-
ests of the trust beneficiaries. For all practical purposes,
such a court termination amounts to an acceleration of the
conclusion of the trust; and the general rule seems to be that
a/1 the beneficiaries of the trust, being sui juris, may compel
a termination of the trust even though the trustee may be
unwilling 43 But, where the termination of the trust would
defeat a material purpose of the settlor in his creation of the
trust, the court will not permit its being brought to an end
merely because the beneficiaries are willing that this be
done. 44 It must be stressed, at all events, that where there are
contingent beneficiaries or beneficiaries incapable of giving
141. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 334. See Leaphart v. National
Surety Corp., note 107 supra.
142. Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 341, 343.
143. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 337 (1); 45 A. L. R. 743, sup-
plemented in 123 A. L. R. 1427 and 163 A. L. R. 163; Kennedy v. Badgett,
19 S. C. 591 (1883); Magrath v. Magrath, 184 S. C. 243, 192 S. E. 273
(1937).
144. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 337 (2); and see the annotations
in A. L. R. set out in note 143 supra; Mauldin v. Mauldin, note 124
supra; Dumas v. Carroll, 112 S. C. 284, 99 S. E. 801 (1919).
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consent, the trust cannot be terminated-since that would
really be a perversion of the trust.145
A lesser, included, situation-or, perhaps, an analogous
one-is that presented in the -anticipation of corpus or prin-
cipal. Thus, where income is to be paid to one for life or for
a lesser period and the principal is then paid to another, or
where the income is to be paid to one for a period and then
the corpus is to be delivered to him, the question of hasten-
ing the payment or delivery of the corpus may arise. The
matter is too complex and lengthy to be discussed here, but
it may, nevertheless, be pointed out that a case may arise
where a court may be asked to consent to, or direct, a trus-
tee's turning over the principal to the beneficiary of the
corpus at a time prior to the date directed by the trust in-
strument, and thereby work the trust's earlier termination.
4 6
If the trustee is willing, and, at the direction of the sole bene-
ficiary, he turns over the corpus to the beneficiary, even
though by the terms of the trust the enjoyment is postponed
to a later time, it seems that the trust is thereby terminated;
and the court's approval of the transfer would only be a rec-
ognition of an existing fact.147
The power of a court of equity to terminate a trust--
not to defeat it-under circumstances that do not work in-
jury to the beneficiaries or frustrate a material purpose of
the settlor, appears to be quite firmly established. Whether
a Probate Court can exercise the same function will depend,
again, on the scope of the authority implied under Section
209; and, absent a plenary grant of power, such a preroga-
tive is hardly to be assumed as vested in that court.
In Beasley v. Newell,148 a testamentary trust was created
for the testator's widow for life, and at her death the re-
mainder was to be divided among the testator's and her chil-
dren. The widow filed a petition in the Probate Court asking
145. Mauldin v. Mauldin, note 124 supra; Dumas v. Carroll, note
144 supra; Piegler v. Jefferies, 128 S. C. 254, 121 S. E. 783 (1923);
Bettis v. Harrison, 186 S. C. 352, 195 S. E. 835 (1938). The court,
of course, in furtherance of the objects of the trust, permits de-
viation, authorizes change in investment, etc. These matters have al-
ready been touched on. In such cases there is an alteration of the
subject matter, but no destruction of the trust.
146. See Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 337, 338.
147. Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 342 (1) and comm. e.
148. 40 S. C. 16, 18 S. E. 224 (1893).
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that the trustee be allowed to pay over to such children as
had become of age their respective shares, and to pay over
shares to the other children as they became of age; and for
that purpose she was willing to surrender progressively her
life interest. A decree of the Probate Judge so ordering was
obtained, and the trustee paid over to the children who were
of age their shares of the trust fund. Thereafter, when the
other children came of age, a petition was filed by the widow
and those children, alleging that the trustee had failed to pay
over either the accumulated income to her or the remaining
shares of the corpus to the children, and asking that the trus-
tee be compelled to make such payments. The Probate Judge
rendered a decree against the trustee. The trustee did not
pay, and this action was brought, not against the trustee,
but against a surety for the trustee. One of the defenses was
that "the Probate Court had no jurisdiction, either to call
the trustee to account, or to pass the order authorizing or
requiring him to anticipate the payment of the corpus of the
trust estate." Of this contention the Supreme Court said:
"Next, as to the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court of Probate. Under the facts as found in this case,
we do not deem it necessary to inquire into that ques-
tion; for the trustee * * * having submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of that court, and having acted under
the judgment first rendered, by paying over to such of
the children as were then of age their shares of the trust
fund, as directed by the decree of the Judge of Probate,
and having acquiesced in the second decree by not rais-
ing the question of jurisdiction or appealing from the
decree, is now estopped from disputing the jurisdiction
of the Court of Probate * * * ; and the defendant, who
claims under him and is only entitled to his right in the
premises, would likewise be estopped."
Thus, while a clear issue of Probate Court jurisdiction
was presented, the court decided the case on other grounds.
It would not be worthwhile to speculate on what the outcone
would have been if the jurisdictional issue had been raised
at a proper time and under appropriate circumstances; and,
even if the case had been concluded on a jurisdictional note,
its authority might be questioned as having arisen under a
set of facts governed by the Constitution of 1868.
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X
Please make such comments as you may wish on the gen-
eral subject under discussion, particularly giving your criti-
cisms a to existing laws and your suggestions for clarifi-
cation and improvement.
11 made no comment; the comments of the others include
the following statements:
"Jurisdiction should be enlarged to include the construc-
tion of wills."
"The law as it exists is indefinite-a chapter in the Code
should be devoted exclusively to testamentary trustees creat-
ing new sections clarifying these matters."
"I think there is a great need for improvement in most
of the laws covering Probate Court."
"The existing laws of South Carolina covering testamen-
tary trusts should be by all means clarified * * * The Probate
Court and attorneys of South Carolina alike agree that all
trust matters should be handled in the Court of Common
Pleas."
"Where there are contradictions, such as the removal and
the naming of trustees, clarify these."
"Laws about trusts are very vague and need clarifying."
"My experience has been that most trusteeships are very
broad and in most instances vague and rather of a personal
nature-a sort of man to man relationship, not impersonal.
I believe that the trustee should be required to give bond and
render accounting as do other fiduciary relationships whether
individual or by a bank or other corporations clothed with
the care of trust (funds) belonging to some person or per-
sons."
"I feel that in many instances direct authority of the Pro-
bate Court in many matters that come before it are vague,
ambiguous and indefinite."
"I think that our law as relating to testamentary trustees
is not clear enough for us to know what is to be done * * . To
me the matter of trusts is more confusing than any other law
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we have relative to estates. I feel that we need a well written
trust law that would enable everyone to know how they
should be handled."
"In my opinion the Probate Court has very little juris-
diction over testamentary trustees. Yet, in order to deter-
mine just what jurisdiction it does have requires considerable
time, effort and study on the part of the members of the bar.
It seems to me this situation could easily be remedied by the
General Assembly. Let it take away from the Probate Courts
all jurisdiction in regard to testamentary trustees, substituted
trustees, or trustees appointed by the court where the one
appointed by the will refuses to act, or else enact legislation
giving the Probate Courts general and broad powers over
such trustees, and defining clearly and concisely and specific-
ally the powers so conferred."
Comment and Conclusions-
The comments of the Probate Judges quoted above, and
the lack of comment from half of those who returned their
questionnaire, make it clear enough that, in the minds of the
Probate Judges-who have to decide these things if and when
they are brought to their attention-their jurisdiction over
testamentary trusts and trustees is shrouded in doubt. The
twenty-four Probate Judges who did not answer, by their
silence, furnish a commentary that can pretty well fall into
the same classification. The question-by-question analysis of
the various statutes, and the scrutiny of particular acts of
the testamentary trustee, reveal not merely an innate diffi-
culty in the law, but the answers of the various Judges dis-
close fundamental clashes of opinion which go beyond the
judges themselves: for these opinions are, no doubt, based
to a very considerable degree on the judgments of lawyers
upon whom the judges rely, and in that sense they represent
a cleavage among the members of the bar.
So far as the writer is concerned, and despite the un-
authoritative nature of his opinions, his summary of the
whole legal problem is as follows:
It is highly questionable, notwithstanding the correctness
of the result of Bradford v. Richardson,4 9 that the legislature
149. Note 6 supra. See the discussion in the text to which notes 7,
8, 9, and 10 supra are appended.
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can confer jurisdiction upon the Probate Court over trusts
or trustees, since these are not "matters testamentary", the
writer basing his opinion on the belief that the legislature
can grant Probate Courts power to deal only with "matters
testamentary" and those other matters mentioned in Article
V, Section 19, of the Constitution of 1895. But, taking the
Bradford case literally and assuming that the legislature can
confer such jurisdiction, that jurisdiction can be referred-
save when there are special statutes--only to Section 209 of
the Code, which, in itself, is ambiguous, and which is not
to be taken as a plenary grant of power, unless we assume a
legislative bounty which is beyond all reason., If plenary, power
is denied the Probate Courts, they have no power, then, to
name trustees or to replace trustees, construe wills for the
purpose of advising trustees, authorize sales, mortgages, or
pledges, permit other deviations, or perform any of the numer-
ous functions resident in a court of equity. But the great and
baffling question is: How far does Section 209 go? So long as
there is not an authoritative answer to that question, the
whole area of jurisdiction is without form or substance. And
when we come to the specific statutes which have been dis-
cussed, every one of them which couples the trustee with
other fiduciaries accountable to the Probate Court, or which
seems to give the Probate Court jurisdiction, is a jumble of
conflict and uncertainty. As to the special status of the
Charleston Probate Court, to attempt to find its particular
place in this whole discussion would be only to draw the
noose of confusion tighter. (See footnote 6.) Charleston is, as
usual, sui generMs-the legal euphemism for "in a class by
itself"-which is itself a euphemism.
Taking into account all. these things: the contradictions,
ambiguities, and uncertainties in the law, the varying opinions
of the Probate Judges and the lawyers, the reluctance to dis-
close views-all these add up to a very definite need for
reform. It is no answer to say that the "safe thing" to do is
to go to the Court of Common Pleas, where jurisdiction is
unequivocally present; nor is it consoling to point to the ab-
sence of litigation in these various problems as indicative of
the lack of need for greater precision. The law needs clarity
no matter what past experience may have demonstrated, and
it is particularly unsatisfactory that any attempt should be
made to justify inaction on the ground that, while the oppor-
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tunity to raise the jurisdictional question has arisen in so
many cases, the issue has been avoided or glossed over. The
answer to that question is that estoppel, waiver, and rati-
fication-while they may close mouths, and while they
may settle the rights of the parties-do not settle the law or
establish precedent. We are not warranted in assuming that
jurisdiction is present in a given case because the court does
not take the trouble to make mention of it.
There are three choices. The first is to let the law stand
and await the day when the courts make the law clear. If
past experience is any guide, that time is far off, and the
chances are that judicial clarification will only be fragmentary
and piecemeal. The policy of "playing safe" by resorting to
the Court of Common Pleas, while it may be the practical and
advisable thing to do, is really only a demonstration of that
fear which, in Hamlet's words, "puzzles the will and makes
us rather bear those ills we have than fly to others we know
not of." The law, as it is now written, is worse than no law.
The second choice is to grant the Probate Courts the
plenary power to control trusts-with every incident of super-
vision and enforcement and permissible conduct that a court
of equity has; to make, in other words, the power of the Pro-
bate Court as full, complete, effective, and pervading as that
which a court of equity has. But we must face reality. To
confer in this fashion a power of such magnitude would be,
effectually, to bestow a large segment of equity jurisdiction
on inferior courts and thereby to create 46 little chancellors.'5
There is no requirement in the law that Probate Judges be
lawyers or learned in the law; but, being sensible laymen,
they would hardly desire to become the heirs of the sovereigns
of equity, with the delicate and heavy responsibilities of that
high estate.
The writer has been given the explanation by many of his
former students whom he sent out to high-pressure Probate
Judges into answering the questionnaires that the reason for
their refusal, in some cases, and their reluctance, in others,
to answer the questiong was due to their feeling that as lay-
men they did not-nor could they be expected to-know about
such intricate matters. That feeling of self-doubt is cause
150. The writer is not unmindful that in many counties of the state
the Probate Judge is also Master in Equity.
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for sympathetic understanding, and a reason for extenuation,
but from those very admissions the lesson emerges that such
refined matters are not to be intrusted to jurists who unhesi-
tatingly admit their equitable shortcomings. The writer is
tempted to subscribe to the sentiments of a Circuit Judge ex-
pressed in the case of !Thomaw v. Poole :16
"It is not consistent with public policy that the estates,
and especially real estates, of married women, minors
and absent defendants, shall be subjected in the almost
private way in which these proceedings are taken in
the Probate Court, to the judgment of officers who, though
of high integrity, have, for many reasons, very little ex-
perience in adjusting the very delicate and very often
very difficult questions which arise in these causes."
But the writer will not entirely yield to that temptation
because, on the point in issue which provoked these senti-
ments, the learned judge was told by the Supreme Court that
he was wrong. It may seem surprising that Probate Judges
-the vast majority of them not educated formally in the law
-are so infrequently reversed. That they seldom stray into
error is due, in part, to their reliance on their own research
and industry, in part to their own instinct for the truth, and
in part to the disinterested guidance of members of the local
bars. The writer knows a few, and has heard of some others,
whose reliance upon the last ingredient is virtually negligible.
In this category it must be pointed out that there are a few
who happen also to be lawyers. This is not to be taken, how-
ever, as an inference that the lawyer-judges are infallible.
The last, and remaining, choice is to strip the Probate
Courts of every vestige of trust jurisdiction, and to excise
every statutory provision which might now be taken to confer
that jurisdiction. The volume of trust administrations pro-
cessed through the Probate Courts is, actually, so slender that
to cut it off altogether would cause only the slightest financial
pain. But even if considerations of fees should enter into the
picture, it must be remembered that "Public offices are created
for the benefit of the commonwealth, and not to give persons
employment or furnish positions to people. Incumbents have
no contract or property right in them or their unearned
151. Note 5 supra.
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remuneration.' 52 The writer, however, does not feel that any
such gross considerations would affect the judgment of Pro-
bate Judges as to whether they should be allowed to retain,
or whether they should be shorn of, trust jurisdiction. On the
contrary, the detachment of trust jurisdiction from the Pro-
bate Court would be welcomed with relief by a great majority
of the Probate Judges, who are well content with the ordinary
and customary functions of their office. That it would be
welcomed even more by the bar is hardly open to dispute.163
152. Parker v. Brown, 195 S. C. 35, 10 S. E. (2d) 625 (1940).
153. The writer feels considerably less reproachful towards the 24
silent members of the probate judiciary as he finishes writing this
piece than he felt when he started it. He has just remembered that
he sent questionnaires to 43 colleagues, Professors of the Law of Trusts,
in law schools over the country, asking about Probate Court jurisdiction
over testamentary trusts in their respective states. He received 21
replies.
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